On the question of how the evolving relationship between the US and China will influence the international order, there are few individuals whose observations receive equal attention on both sides of the Pacific.
Former US secretary of State Henry Kissinger is one; Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀), is another.
In profiling Lee for Time magazine’s 2010 list of the world’s 100 most influential people, Kissinger said: “There is no better strategic thinker.”
Seeing the 21st century as a “contest for supremacy in the Pacific” between the US and China, Lee hopes that the two countries can fashion a viable power-sharing arrangement. Clearly, “Chinese power is growing,” but he does not “see the Americans retreating from Asia.”
In his view, “the best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive.”
In Lee’s judgement, China’s leadership will make a serious effort to avoid a military confrontation with the US — at least for the next several decades. The Chinese recognize that only when they have “overtaken the US in the development and application of technology can they envisage confronting the US militarily.”
Furthermore, Lee says, China’s “great advantage is not in military influence, but in … economic influence.”
Lee predicts that China “will be the top importer and exporter of all East Asian countries” within two decades.
He says that it is currently “sucking the Southeast Asian countries into its economic system because of its vast market and growing purchasing power. Japan and South Korea will inevitably be sucked in as well.”
Lee is certain that China’s leaders want to displace the US as the leading power in the Asia-Pacific.
“How could they not aspire to be number one in Asia?” he asks.
In the three-and-a-half decades since China embarked on its market reforms, it has risen more rapidly along more dimensions of power than any other country in history. While it may not be in any “hurry to displace the US” regionally, this progress has spurred a “reawakened sense of destiny” that Lee regards as “an overpowering force.”
Lee worries less about the current generation of China’s leaders than he does about the next. The former have experienced “the Great Leap Forward, hunger, starvation, near collision with the Russians … the Cultural Revolution gone mad.”
However, China’s young people “have lived only during a period of peace and growth in China, and have no experience of China’s tumultuous past.” They think that China has “already arrived.”
In Lee’s view, China will eventually face “a fateful decision:” whether to seek to “be a hegemon” in the Asia-Pacific.
He believes that the US can influence that decision “more than any other country.”
If it “attempts to humiliate China … it will assure itself an enemy,” he says.
Lee concludes that “Peace and security in the Asia-Pacific will turn on whether China emerges as a xenophobic, chauvinistic force, bitter and hostile to the West, because it tried to slow down or abort its development,” or “educated and involved in the ways of the world, more cosmopolitan, more internationalized and outward-looking.”
No one can be certain which it will be, but Lee offers wise counsel for statespeople seeking to avoid a catastrophic war.
Graham Allison is director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Robert D. Blackwill is senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ali Wyne is an associate of the Belfer Center and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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