A conflict between Japan and South Korea has gotten so intense, with no resolution in sight, that it may be time for the US to step in to insist that its two allies put the past behind them and tend to the more urgent issues of today.
The immediate question is a dispute about sovereignty over rocks in the sea between the two nations called Dokdo by Koreans, Takeshima by Japanese and the Liancourt Rocks by the US and most of the rest of the world.
However, that squabble is only the latest in a complicated history that goes back to Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1905 to 1945. Before that was a political, cultural, economic and military rivalry that began in the sixth century.
Today, this antipathy seems so deep-rooted that no resolution is possible.
Victor Cha, a Korean-American academic who is a leading authority on this issue, wrote recently: “Historical animosity between Korea and Japan will never die. Historical issues are inherently irresolvable.”
Cha, of Georgetown University in Washington, pointed to the “deep reservoir of distrust” on both sides. Temporary solutions have been sought, he said, “but the anger and resentment never go away.”
Cha, who served on the national security staff in the White House in 2004 to 2007, thus concluded: “We have to accept the reality that historical enmity constitutes the baseline of Seoul-Tokyo relations.”
This baseline, in turn, is the weakest link in the US security posture in Asia, a flaw that one day could be fatal if confrontations with North Korea or China erupt into hostilities.
In pursuit of its national interests, the US would appear to have four choices: One, to keep its hands off because a settlement is impossible; two, to muddle through, urging Korean and Japanese leaders to get along; three, to mediate a settlement; or four, to require Japanese and Korean leaders to find a solution as the price of a continued alliance with the US.
Options One and Two are unacceptable because too much is at stake. Option Three would be dangerous because the US would almost certainly be seen as favoring one side or the other and the mediation would most likely fail.
To pursue Option Four, the US should be unquestionably even-handed and be seen by all as even-handed. To compel Korean and Japanese leaders, the US could:
‧ Caution them that the US Congress and public have limited patience with those who bicker over rocks in the water and thus could seriously damage Japanese and Korean interests in the US;
‧ Take the issue to the UN Security Council. The council could do little to force a resolution, but Japan and Korea would be embarrassed internationally. The US would also veto Japan or Korea from taking a rotating seat on the council.
‧ Quietly inform Korean and Japanese leaders that any hint of a military show of force or other confrontation would cause their security treaties with the US to lapse. (The treaties are written to give the US an easy out.)
‧ Disclose that US forces in both nations would no longer conduct joint training with their forces and the question of whether US forces would be available for the defense of South Korea or Japan would be left open.
Complicating any US effort to lean on the Japanese and Koreans would be Americans who have become “Japan hands” or “Korea hands” through long contacts with Koreans or Japanese. Some tend to favor one side or another.
Jeffrey Hornung, a researcher at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies funded by the Defense Department in Honolulu, has written that Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s recent visit to Dokdo/Takeshima “was irresponsible and the consequences will be long lasting.”
Hornung, a Japan specialist, asserted that “the Japanese government and society have made concerted efforts to understand, reconcile and apologize for Japan’s wartime aggression.”
Daniel Sneider, of a research center at Stanford University in California and a longtime student of Korea, has contended: “Japanese history textbooks do not provide students with a detailed accounting of Japanese colonial rule, particularly in Korea.”
He maintains Japan has “avoided or downplayed some of the more controversial aspects of the wartime period, such as the coercive recruitment of women for sexual services by the Japanese Imperial Army.”
By contrast, Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum think tank in Honolulu, has said: “Enough is enough! Obviously, the political leadership in Tokyo and Seoul never learned about the First Rule of Holes: When you find yourself in one, stop digging.”
“Each side seems to be going out of its way to make a bad situation worse,” Cossa said.
He said that “significant damage has already been done” and “it’s getting worse by the day.”
Richard Halloran is a commentator in Hawaii.
In a stark reminder of China’s persistent territorial overreach, Pema Wangjom Thongdok, a woman from Arunachal Pradesh holding an Indian passport, was detained for 18 hours at Shanghai Pudong Airport on Nov. 24 last year. Chinese immigration officials allegedly informed her that her passport was “invalid” because she was “Chinese,” refusing to recognize her Indian citizenship and claiming Arunachal Pradesh as part of South Tibet. Officials had insisted that Thongdok, an Indian-origin UK resident traveling for a conference, was not Indian despite her valid documents. India lodged a strong diplomatic protest, summoning the Chinese charge d’affaires in Delhi and demanding
With the Year of the Snake reaching its conclusion on Monday next week, now is an opportune moment to reflect on the past year — a year marked by institutional strain and national resilience. For Taiwan, the Year of the Snake was a composite of political friction, economic momentum, social unease and strategic consolidation. In the political sphere, it was defined less by legislative productivity and more by partisan confrontation. The mass recall movement sought to remove 31 Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators following the passage of controversial bills that expanded legislative powers and imposed sweeping budget cuts. While the effort
When Hong Kong’s High Court sentenced newspaper owner Jimmy Lai (黎智英) to 20 years in prison this week, officials declared that his “heinous crimes” had long poisoned society and that his punishment represented justice restored. In their telling, Lai is the mastermind of Hong Kong’s unrest — the architect of a vast conspiracy that manipulated an otherwise contented population into defiance. They imply that removing him would lead to the return of stability. It is a politically convenient narrative — and a profoundly false one. Lai did not radicalize Hong Kong. He belonged to the same generation that fled from the Chinese
There is a story in India about a boy called Prahlad who was an ardent worshipper of Lord Narayana, whom his father considered an enemy. His son’s devotion vexed the father to the extent that he asked his sister, Holika, who could not be burned by fire, to sit with the boy in her lap and burn him to death. Prahlad knew about this evil plan, but sat in his aunt’s lap anyway. His faith won, as he remained unscathed by the fire, while his aunt was devoured by the flames. In some small way, Prahlad reminds me of Taiwan