Lawmakers in the newly elected legislature officially started their duties last Wednesday. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) holds 40 seats, while its allies in the Taiwan Solidarity Union have three, giving the pan-green camp control of one seat more than one-third of the legislature. The DPP also garnered nearly 46 percent of the vote in the presidential election. These developments provide the possibility for the nature of the nation’s political sysem to move away from the single-party domination of the past four years and toward proper two-party politics.
However, some conditions will have to be met for this to happen. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must be willing to set aside its single-party, monopolistic mentality and start to respect civil service and uphold administrative neutrality. It must be willing to give the DPP the responsibility of playing the role of an opposition party so that the DPP can improve its ability to present its policies and aspire to set up a shadow government.
The DPP held the presidency, and thus control of the central government, for eight years until 2008. As the party’s presidential candidate in this year’s election, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) guided her party when deciding what issues to put forward in the campaign. The party’s 10-year policy platform, published in August last year, is full of good ideas, but unfortunately not enough was done to turn these ideas into concrete policies.
Now Tsai has decided to establish her own office and it will be interesting to observe the three-way interaction between the DPP’s central committee, its legislative caucus and Tsai’s office. After being elected as DPP chairperson four years ago, Tsai helped revive the party up from a low after the 2008 elections and although the result of the presidential election was not the one DPP supporters hoped for, it was an honorable loss and Tsai’s contribution to her party cannot be denied.
She won a lot of support for the party from swing voters who were undecided when the campaign began, especially from among young and middle-class people. She also transformed the DPP’s image into that of a moderate party with a global outlook with the qualities voters expect from a modern political party.
These things were largely lacking under former DPP leaders. If the DPP wishes to return to government in future, it cannot afford to backtrack on these advances. Rather, it should cherish the foundation Tsai has laid and continue to better the improvements she has introduced.
A large number of middle-aged DPP politicians have now taken up seats in the legislature, offering a ray of hope to the party. In addition, there are six DPP city mayors and county commissioners. The party must continue to work hard on managing the localities, especially in Greater Taichung and further north.
In addition, it needs to strengthen its policy formation and presentation, and put forward systematic policy proposals on issues such as China, the economy, government efficiency and social justice, so that people can compare them with those of the other parties. It is the DPP’s duty to do so and it is also an essential way forward for the development of the nation’s democracy.
If the DPP is to play such a role, it will have to keep doing its homework. The DPP’s Policy Research and Coordinating Committee, which could be considered the party’s think tank, and Tsai’s office — once it is up and running — will both have a heavy responsibility in this respect.
A lot of people in the DPP are very good at campaigning, but they are not so good at drawing up policies. However, Tsai is an exception. For the DPP, the final step in the race for government office will not just be a matter of what attitude it takes regarding the so-called “1992 consensus” or of amending the DPP’s 1999 Resolution of Taiwan’s Future. To win the race, it has to win back the public’s confidence in its ability to govern and especially in its ability to formulate and carry out policies.
Since Taiwan does not have a Cabinet system of government, a shadow Cabinet model does not entirely apply. In origin, neither the DPP nor the KMT were formed from the governing elite, combining executive, legislative and party roles. Nevertheless, even in countries with semi-presidential or presidential systems, the main opposition parties tend to form shadow governments in ways that ever more closely resemble the pattern seen in countries with Cabinet systems.
For example, in the US, regardless of whether the opposition party holds the majority of seats in the Senate or the House of Representatives, its congressional caucus is tightly grouped, thus taking on the appearance of a shadow Cabinet. Taiwan lies somewhere between a presidential and a Cabinet system, so many people look to the DPP’s legislative caucus to work as a shadow Cabinet.
Future DPP chairpersons and whoever runs as the party’s candidate in the 2016 presidential election will also have important roles to play. DPP figures have in the past made attempts to run shadow governments, but these were not really representative of the party as a whole, so naturally they could not succeed in their aim. From now on, the party will have to draw on a broader pool of wisdom to put the idea fully into practice.
Is Taiwan headed toward a real two-party system? The single-member constituency system that Taiwan adopted in 2008 is one factor that will tend to move the country in that direction, but the way people cast their votes is another important element. The DPP must live up to public expectations by strengthening its ability to formulate policy and moving toward a shadow Cabinet model.
Taiwan is confronted by the threat of China as well as by political, economic and social challenges at home and abroad. There are countless policy issues to deal with and it goes without saying that a responsible opposition party must live up to its mission of tackling whatever issues might arise.
Lin Chia-cheng is a professor at Soochow University.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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