Mao Zedong (毛澤東) said, famously: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”
China’s late revolutionary leader added, only a tad less famously: “The party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.”
The party he was referring to, is, of course, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the gun is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s armed forces. However, the PLA no longer seems to abide by Mao’s command that it accept party control, instead striking off in its own direction.
China’s military leaders are not openly defying the CCP, but they are ignoring the guidance of party and government leaders.
“The PLA has become a force unto itself,” said David Lai, an experienced US China-watcher. “It is unaccountable to China’s political leaders.”
Lai, an academic born and educated in China before emigrating and becoming a US citizen, has written that the PLA has gradually loosened its ties to the CCP as the armed forces have become more professional.
The party, he said, “is clearly fighting a losing battle.”
A different view was expressed by an academic from Taiwan. He said the CCP had not lost control of the PLA, but added, however, that Chinese commanders routinely ignore the political officers assigned to their units.
For Americans from Hawaii to Washington, the possibility of a disruptive PLA is a cause for anxiety. For the US’ Pacific Command and the Pentagon, which are responsible for deterring China, it has added a complication to an already tense confrontation.
For think tanks and academics, the possibility of an aggressive PLA not controlled by a more cautious party hangs over every deliberation. And those who do business with China worry that friction between the CCP and the PLA could spill over into the economic realm.
Unlike most of the world’s armed forces, the PLA is not a national army, but a party army. China’s military services explicitly owe their allegiance to the CCP, not to a constitution, government or nation. It is as if the US armed forces pledged allegiance to the Democratic or Republican Party.
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), then China’s paramount leader, proclaimed “Four Modernizations” intended to catapult China into the top tier of world powers. In order of priority, China was to improve its agriculture, industry, science and technology to form the base of a modern nation.
National defense was given fourth priority, with Deng urging PLA leaders to be patient. The next year, the PLA was ordered to “teach a lesson” to Vietnam, whose army was among the most experienced in the world. The outgunned and outmaneuvered PLA was trounced.
Later, as China’s economy surged forward, it produced funds needed to modernize the PLA. US officers who dealt with the Chinese noticed a change in attitude as the PLA acquired new weapons, developed training programs and spent less time running farms and businesses.
In recent years, US officers have seen the Chinese become more self-confident, ask better questions and disclose better information in dialogue. That, in turn, has given way to arrogance and belligerence. Some senior US officers say they have been surprised by the personal hostility of Chinese officers.
The PLA, after years of denying visiting US officers access to their bases, now shows them off. When Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US’ Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in China in July, he was invited for a rare visit to the headquarters of the Second Artillery, which is China’s nuclear force.
Less forceful political -leadership has contributed to diluted control over the PLA. Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), the general secretary of the CCP, and former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) before him were party technocrats who lacked the standing of Deng and Mao. New political leaders are due to take office next year and are not expected to be any stronger.
The CCP’s 12-member Central Military Commission is the instrument through which the party supposedly guides the PLA. Its chairman is Hu and vice chairman is Xi Jinping (習近平), considered Hu’s heir apparent. The other 10 members are all generals, however, and several have been outspoken critics of the US.
China watchers in the US said they expect China to continue to prod the US, both verbally and with action, such as harassing US warships in international waters. At the same time, they expect the Chinese to stop short of fomenting all-out war.
The danger lies in the Chinese potential for miscalculation, stepping over a line and triggering a lethal US response.
“They are just not well informed about us and they don’t have enough control over their forces,” a China watcher said.
Richard Halloran is a commentator based in Hawaii.
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