US President Barack Obama, the sixth US president to visit India since it gained independence, arrives at a trying time, both for the US and for India. Some of Obama’s closest advisers have just resigned, opening an awkward gap on national security and the economy — the focus of his meetings with India’s government.
For India, the issues on the agenda for Obama’s visit are immense and complex and the options for resolving them are extremely limited. Those related to security in Afghanistan and Pakistan are as treacherous as they have ever been. Bilateral economic, trade and currency disagreements may not be as bitter as they are between the US and China, but they are thorny, and lack of resolution is making them more intractable.
Nuclear non-proliferation remains one of Obama’s priorities, as does the sale of US civilian nuclear technology to India, for which former US president George W. Bush cleared the way. In addition, Obama will be keen to know what help India can provide with Iran, a country with which India has smooth relations, owing to their shared worries over Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Illustration: June Hsu
Given this potent list of challenges, what are the prospects for Obama’s passage to India? Some years ago, I was queried by then US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott, who was helping to prepare then-US president Bill Clinton’s visit. As India’s foreign minister at the time, I told him: “Why make the visit destinational? Be content with the directional,” or some such words. That response retains its flavor today: As new directions in India-US relations are set, new destinations will follow.
All state visits are overloaded with lofty, superfluous rhetoric. US-India summits are particularly prone to this hubris: the Great Republic meets the World’s Largest Democracy. It would be better for both countries to shed some of these marigold garlands of cloying adjectives.
Another feature of such summits — the trading of lists of “must do” and “can do” items — should also be retired. It is both demeaning and tedious to treat an arriving US president as a stars-and-stripes Santa Claus, to be presented with lengthy wish lists. Likewise, despite the pinched economic circumstances of the US, Obama would do well not to use his visit to peddle US wares. Although trade is an effective lubricant of good relations, these sorts of talks are for the “sherpas,” not Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to handle.
These two great countries, “natural allies” in the words of former Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, should reflect on what they have accomplished together since 1998, in order to map what lies ahead. Theirs is now a relationship of equals, so their national interests need to be reconciled on everything from Pakistan to climate change.
Indeed, Obama is placed in a unique position for a US president, a position that he appears to comprehend, though his domestic opponents do not. Power today begins in the acceptance of the limits placed upon it. This is also true of an India that is only now coming to recognize its new status in the world, in which the country’s limits and responsibilities have expanded mightily.
Ours is an unstable neighborhood, one that the US has entered without fully understanding the consequences — for India and for the neighborhood. India must ask Obama hard questions about how security is to be assured, but before doing so, it needs to ask the same questions of itself.
India must make clear — and the US must recognize — that a sub-continental country of a billion-plus people cannot be kept within the categorical confines of “South Asia.” The US must accept and candidly discuss the damaging consequences of its military, diplomatic and political overreach — of a “war too far” that has brought the region to its current ugly impasse.
What can the two countries do, separately and together? Both leaders must accept that history is destiny and that the irrefutable logic of geography is a determinant of it. This is the only relevant and reliable guide in meeting the region’s complex challenges.
The constraints on US options, the veto of circumstances, offers little room for diplomatic improvisation. Here the greatest constraint is the US’ difficult and worsening relationship with Pakistan. India must understand this troubled partnership, into which the US entered with its eyes wide open, though it would help if Washington accepted that India has paid — and continues to pay — a very high price on this account. Only through such acceptance can the two countries chart a common future.
Likewise, it would be unwise for the US to gratuitously offer China a role in the affairs of a region that includes India itself — something that Obama appeared to do during his visit to China earlier this year, when he mentioned China as having a role to play in Kashmir. The US should also stop questioning India’s relationship with Iran, a neighbor with which India is linked by many centuries of economic, cultural and even civilizational ties.
Two great peoples and countries, although now locked in a “strategic alliance,” may occasionally fall out of step with one another, as India and the US have — for example, over global climate negotiations, but, at such moments, Obama might do well to recall Vajpayee’s words during Clinton’s visit, when he quoted Walt Whitman’s poem Passage to India:
“Sail forth — steer for the deep waters only,
Reckless O soul, exploring, I with thee, and thou with me,
For we are bound where mariner has not yet dared to go.”
Jaswant Singh, a former Indian foreign minister, finance minister and defense minister, is an opposition member of parliament.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
Jan. 1 marks a decade since China repealed its one-child policy. Just 10 days before, Peng Peiyun (彭珮雲), who long oversaw the often-brutal enforcement of China’s family-planning rules, died at the age of 96, having never been held accountable for her actions. Obituaries praised Peng for being “reform-minded,” even though, in practice, she only perpetuated an utterly inhumane policy, whose consequences have barely begun to materialize. It was Vice Premier Chen Muhua (陳慕華) who first proposed the one-child policy in 1979, with the endorsement of China’s then-top leaders, Chen Yun (陳雲) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), as a means of avoiding the
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
A recent piece of international news has drawn surprisingly little attention, yet it deserves far closer scrutiny. German industrial heavyweight Siemens Mobility has reportedly outmaneuvered long-entrenched Chinese competitors in Southeast Asian infrastructure to secure a strategic partnership with Vietnam’s largest private conglomerate, Vingroup. The agreement positions Siemens to participate in the construction of a high-speed rail link between Hanoi and Ha Long Bay. German media were blunt in their assessment: This was not merely a commercial win, but has symbolic significance in “reshaping geopolitical influence.” At first glance, this might look like a routine outcome of corporate bidding. However, placed in
China often describes itself as the natural leader of the global south: a power that respects sovereignty, rejects coercion and offers developing countries an alternative to Western pressure. For years, Venezuela was held up — implicitly and sometimes explicitly — as proof that this model worked. Today, Venezuela is exposing the limits of that claim. Beijing’s response to the latest crisis in Venezuela has been striking not only for its content, but for its tone. Chinese officials have abandoned their usual restrained diplomatic phrasing and adopted language that is unusually direct by Beijing’s standards. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the
RSS