Taipei prosecutors listed Taipei City Government Secretary-General Yang Hsi-an (楊錫安) as a defendant in the Xinsheng Overpass case after raiding the city’s Secretariat and interviewing Yang as well as three construction company owners. Yang was later released on NT$600,000 bail.
Judging from leaked official documents and the statements of two officials who are currently in detention, there seems to be sufficient reason to suspect that the Xinsheng Overpass case might involve higher-level officials. In particular, prosecutors say they have evidence that Yang exchanged e-mails in which he discussed one of the participating contractor’s bid with other officials, while the bidding was still in progress.
Whether Yang benefited or not, he may be in violation of Article 4 of the Anti-Corruption Statute (貪污治罪條例) concerning reporting inflated prices or Article 6 concerning influence peddling in order to benefit others.
Unfortunately, it was difficult to obtain evidence because prosecutors failed to take the initiative to raid the Secretariat in a timely manner. Only about a month after the scandal broke did they interview Yang and search his offices, classifying him as a “third-party” witness rather than a defendant.
However, anyone can see that this move was intended to cover up their real intent as prosecutors said they temporarily did not list Yang, a key official, as a defendant in order to avoid being criticized for interfering with the upcoming special municipality elections.
Although prosecutors listed Yang as a defendant on Wednesday, they immediately allowed him out on bail. However, many cases in recent years, especially serious crimes involving influence peddling, has set the standard that if a defendant does not plead guilty, prosecutors, almost with out exception, request that the court detain the suspect, even if he or she is unlikely to escape or destroy evidence.
Courts rarely overrule such requests. This can be seen from several high-profile cases in recent years, including the corruption cases against former president Chen-Shui-bian (陳水扁), Yunlin County Commissioner Su Chih-fen (蘇治芬) and former Chiayi County commissioner Chen Ming-wen (陳明文). So why did Yang receive better treatment from prosecutors in this case?
The development of the case has highlighted prosecutors’ fear of becoming the target of criticism, as they have exercised their public authority with extreme caution. Unfortunately, the results of their efforts have been labeled as political manipulation by a number of commentators. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) is even provoking prosecutors, thus putting them in a difficult position. If prosecutors continue to take so many political factors into consideration, it will be even more difficult for them to strengthen their office’s neutrality and independence.
Wu Ching-chin is an assistant professor in Aletheia University’s department of financial and economic law.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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