In the field of international relations, there is a theory called “domestic audience cost.” According to this theory, the political leaders of a country might send out signals to intensify a conflict with an enemy state in the hope that this will function as a deterrent to the state in question. This is risky, however, because if they then pull back once conflict intensifies, they run the risk of disappointing their domestic audience. The cost of that could affect their political standing.
In democracies, the domestic audience cost is evaluated in regular elections where voters can punish those leaders that have disappointed them through their ballots. In authoritarian countries, however, there are no regular elections to highlight domestic audience cost.
According to the theory, as the risk of conflict intensifies, democratic states are better than non-democratic states at clearly conveying a credible deterrent.
The domestic audience cost analysis is generally used to explain the domestic effect encountered by political leaders during ongoing conflicts and their understanding of the intentions of the leaders of the enemy state.
Simply put, because of the higher degree of transparency in democratic states there are more effective restraints on the power of political leaders, and this makes it easier for their opponents to see their intentions.
If the political leaders in a democracy send out signals that will lead to the intensification of a conflict, those statements will inevitably create a domestic reaction. That reaction will quickly make the statements of political leaders self--fulfilling, and as such, must be taken seriously.
By comparison, the domestic audience cost is lower in events aimed at creating peace. If a leader in a democratic country expresses a wish to create peace with a belligerent state, but later regrets having done so, some domestic peace proponents might criticize the leader’s moral rectitude, but generally speaking, the strength of their condemnation might not be as strong as the support from those who are in favor of a more hawkish stance, particularly if the democratic state in question is under threat.
How believable is it if a non-democratic state sends out signals that it wants peace?
Non-democratic states are not transparent and there are no restraints on their powers. This makes it very likely that people would doubt claims that they are interested in peace.
To go one step further, if political leaders in an authoritarian state retreat from a claim that they want peace and instead move in a more hawkish direction, that creates almost no domestic reaction because in such a state people are more likely to hold a jingoistic attitude toward the outside world. Peace activists will find it very difficult to make their voices heard in such a state.
Further, if this non-democratic state is threatening another state, any promise of peace should be met with even more skepticism. For the leaders of a non-democratic state, therefore, the domestic audience cost of retreating from a call for peace will be lower than in a democratic state and lower than if they step back from a promise to increase the tension in a conflict.
It will also be lower than it would be in a state that is under threat.
This means that a move toward peace by a non-democratic state that is also threatening another state is the least credible of all.
This theory provides a clear explanation of why Chinese official Jiang Ping’s (江平) statements at the Tokyo Film Festival triggered such a vehement response in Taiwan so quickly. It also explains why China’s promises to Taiwan of peace are always met with suspicion and expectations that it has ulterior motives.
In terms of cross-strait relations, precisely because Taiwan is a democratic state and China is not, and precisely because Taiwan is under threat, but China is not, the domestic audience cost for any promise of peace on behalf of China will be extremely low. This is why it is so difficult for China’s political leaders to win the trust of the Taiwanese public no matter how hard they try and no matter how many concessions they may make in Taiwan’s favor.
Hsu Szu-chien is an assistant research fellow in the provisional office of Academia Sinica’s Institute of Political Science.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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