During his recent visit to Taiwan, Li Yafei (李亞飛), deputy chairman and secretary-general of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and assistant minister at the Taiwan Affairs Office, said on Aug. 11 that the “1992 consensus” was defined as “each side verbally stating the common understanding that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to insist that there is only one China.”
The so-called “1992 consensus” was supposedly arrived at by the ARATS and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Hong Kong in 1992.
Li’s remarks marked the first time that China has given an unambiguous definition of the “1992 consensus” since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was elected in 2008. Coming as it did in a public address during a visit to SEF Deputy Chairman Kao Koong-lian (高孔廉), this is also very close to being a formal notification. Later, the Presidential Office stressed that the “1992 consensus” means “one China, with each side having its own interpretation,” and that to Taiwan, “one China” refers to the Republic of China (ROC), adding that there is no alternative interpretation.
Clearly, there is no common understanding between the two sides when it comes to the meaning of the so-called “1992 consensus.”
Prior to 2008, China insisted on a strategically clear definition of the “1992 consensus” — both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhering to the “one China” principle — and strong criticism of and opposition to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government’s interpretation of the concept.
Since 2008, China has adjusted it’s view of the concept somewhat, moving from strategic clarity to strategic ambiguity. When Ma has reiterated the Presidential Office’s view of the “1992 consensus,” China has never publicly refuted his interpretation, although they have never affirmed it either. For a little more than two years, China’s strategically ambiguous view of the concept has allowed the two sides to find new strategic common ground. In this context, the “1992 consensus” and “each side having its own interpretation” have facilitated a genuine development in the direction of cross-strait peace.
KMT Deputy Secretary-General Chang Jung-kung (張榮恭) said in an interview that Li’s definition of the “1992 consensus” basically corresponded to reality at the time of the 1992 talks. Although China and Taiwan still differ in their views of the concept, Chang said that ongoing cross-strait exchanges and negotiations over the past two years “prove that the ‘1992 consensus’ is effective.”
The problem is that China seems to have adjusted its strategic approach to Taiwan after the two signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), and as a result, a gap has sprung up between the two sides as they look to map out common ground for the future.
On July 30, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Defense suggested that the two sides negotiate a formal end to cross-strait hostilities and reach a peace agreement based on the “one China” principle.
Then, on Aug. 7, ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) was interviewed by Xinhua news agency and last Wednesday Li visited Kao. Both said the common political foundation for Taiwan and China was opposition to Taiwanese independence and insistence on adherence to the “1992 consensus.” What’s more, Li gave Kao a clear definition of the concept and said no restrictions should be applied to the scope of cross-strait political and military talks.
When compared with the talk given by Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛), there are fundamental differences in Taiwan’s and China’s view of the basis for political trust, what issues should be negotiated and any decisions on Taiwan’s future. Lai said China must take a serious look at the fact that the ROC does exist and give up policies and legislation that allows it to use military force against Taiwan if it wants to build a basis for complete mutual trust and push on to more permanent peaceful relations between the two. Lai also said that Taiwan will not comply with China’s wish to engage in political and military talks and that “the future of Taiwan must be decided by the 23 million Taiwanese through democratic and free choice, not through a unilateral Chinese decision.”
Beijing seems to already have laid out its cross-strait strategy for the period from the signing of the ECFA until Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election. We have to wait and see if China’s strategic ambiguity will change back toward strategic clarity and bring about a sea change in the development of cross-strait relations.
Nevertheless, Beijing’s political goals are clear — to demand that the Ma administration cooperate with China to restrict moves toward Taiwanese independence, that it strengthen the pledge to respect the “one China” principle and that it move toward cross-strait political and military talks.
Tung Chen-yuan is a professor in the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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