On at least 18 separate occasions since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office just two years ago, media or government departments here or abroad have openly called for China to remove the missiles it has pointed at Taiwan. The last occasion was on May 6 during a videoconference hosted by Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, when Ma said that unless China removes the missiles targeting Taiwan, he would not take further steps to negotiate a cross-strait peace agreement.
There has been no clear official response from China on this, other than the assertion on Jan. 21 last year by Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman Colonel Hu Changming (胡昌明) that the timing of any redeployment was contingent on how the situation develops. China has taken little notice of calls to remove the missiles, and there is no practical significance, from a military point of view, even if it agrees to do so. As former minister of national defense Chen Chao-min (陳肇敏) said on June 2, 2008: “Taking the missiles away may send a political message, but it doesn’t really mean anything in military terms, because the missiles can be redeployed at any time.”
On Wednesday last week, US Senator Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told a Senate meeting: “In my meeting with some of the leadership, it was mentioned that China had offered to redeploy back. Now I understand the word ‘redeploy’ isn’t ‘remove.’”
Although neither the US nor China has officially confirmed Feinstein’s statement, it does suggest that the situation has changed, albeit in a subtle way.
China has recently offered a range of compromises to facilitate the signing of a proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan. Another issue high on Beijing’s agenda is how it can stop the US from selling arms to Taiwan. When US President Barack Obama’s administration gave the green light to a US$6.4 billion arms sales package, Beijing for some reason held back on blaming Taiwan and instead focused its anger on the US. It immediately ceased all military exchanges with the US and this month even rejected a proposed visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.
Feinstein’s comments imply that Beijing may now be thinking in terms of changing the current military deployment aimed at Taiwan. On the surface, this may seem to be the demonstration of goodwill that Taiwan has been looking for, but one suspects it may be little more than a ploy by China to strengthen its hand. Through this, China could get the US to agree to stop selling arms to Taiwan, with China likely adding another concession that would benefit US national interests. While this approach is unlikely to succeed in getting the US to cancel arms sales outright, it might induce Washington to postpone or suspend the sale.
The issue of arms sales to Taiwan is a sensitive one, and the US knows this. It consider its national interests as a whole, taking into account the current situation in the Asia-Pacific region and other factors that we are not privy to. The question is how to respond to the issue with the Taiwanese government or with Beijing, when it officially brings the subject up — which is very likely to happen after an ECFA is signed. This is sure to be a political minefield, whatever approach the US ends up taking.
Another factor will be the response of Taiwan’s armed forces, and how they could continue to make an impact on the political decision-making process and avoid being sidelined as a result. This is going to be a severe challenge for military command, and a test of both its judgment and vision.
Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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