The 10th anniversary of the 921 Earthquake has just passed. After Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) took office, he said his Cabinet would focus on disaster prevention and relief. President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has publicly stated that Typhoon Morakot made the government realize that prevention is more important than disaster management, while Vice Premier Eric Chu (朱立倫), who is in charge of the Cabinet’s disaster prevention and relief unit, said the government would instruct the military to set up emergency response teams in Keelung, Taichung, Kaohsiung and Hualien.
In addition to reorganizing the National Fire Agency (NFA) to create a new disaster prevention and protection agency, Minister of the Interior Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺), who is charged with rebuilding the government’s disaster prevention and protection system, suggested that the Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Council (中央災害防救會報) and its subordinate Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission (災害防救委員會) be merged.
He also suggested a Cabinet-level disaster protection and prevention office be established. These are probably good suggestions, but to ensure this office is effective, a minister without portfolio should be assigned full-time to the office with the task of coordinating and integrating efforts across government agencies. This is preferable to leaving the vice premier or another minister in charge.
The Morakot disaster was a test of whether all levels of government abide by the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (災害防救法).
Inadequate disaster prevention measures, slow relief efforts and ineffectual command followed by excessive government corrections in the aftermath reflect inadequate “command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” (C4ISR).
C4ISR will be crucial to establishing an effective disaster prevention and protection agency. If the agency is not elevated to the same administrative level as the Coast Guard Administration, how can there be a cross-departmental system for disaster prevention and response?
C4ISR requires substantial funding, so if the agency is not made independent of the Ministry of the Interior, its budget will likely be inadequate.
My hope is that Jiang will be able to shake off the MOI’s arrogance and refer to the US’ Federal Emergency Management Agency in planning the agency’s administrative level and merging it with the proposed Cabinet-level disaster protection and prevention office. That would combine policy-making and execution into one office, which is the only way to avoid the problem of too many people pulling in too many directions.
The agency should focus on preventing and responding to natural disasters such as typhoons, flooding and earthquakes.
As for the government, it should have learned from Morakot that the military must establish four disaster response teams and regional military disaster relief organizations that can be directed by mayors and county commissioners.
The problem is that the military’s management, command and administrative systems are separate, in addition to the many different levels of military control.
These issues raise the question of how local government chiefs would be able to order the military to initiate disaster relief work.
The NFA’s manpower and equipment is already over-stretched. Putting it in charge of handling natural disasters is not advisable, while hiring and training new staff would be too time-consuming.
The government should consider the option of using the forces assigned to the Reserve Command’s (後備司令部) city and county regiment control districts and command centers.
After receiving specialized rescue training, they could be assigned to the disaster prevention and protection agency or to the army.
In normal times, they could fall under the command of — and be equipped and trained by — the Cabinet’s disaster prevention and protection agency. When disaster strikes, they could be assigned to local governments’ disaster efforts.
Regular troops at military bases should remain within the normal chain of military command. When disaster strikes, they should participate in relief efforts in surrounding areas.
Non-governmental disaster response groups and religious charities always send large numbers of volunteers and another important task for the government is how to help with coordination so these efforts are not wasted.
Faced with global warming and climate change, the government must establish an effective disaster prevention and relief system if it does not want to see a repeat of the public furor against the ad hoc Central Disaster Emergency Operation Center.
Shu Chin-chiang is a former advisory committee member of the National Security Council and a former chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity Union.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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