Thwarted reputation
Dear Johnny,
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is reputedly proud of being able to conduct interviews with foreign reporters in English, something that former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) could not do. Through these interviews, Ma hopes to build his international reputation.
But with the recent article in the New York Times (“Taiwan president is target of anger after typhoon,” Aug. 13), his efforts have been thwarted. As a long-time commentator, what is your view on this? Also, will his failed effort push him to have closer ties with China ?
Karl Chang
Taipei
Johnny replies: I doubt that one New York Times article will bring the Ma presidency crashing down, but it might start opening eyes to the anger that is growing in the south.
I don’t think Ma needs to be pushed to have closer ties with China under any circumstances. On the contrary, what we might see is the president forced away from an aggressive agenda of cross-strait detente to concentrate on the disaster and salvage domestic support ahead of local elections.
Ironically, Ma’s adequate English hurt him when he told ITN that the villagers of Xiaolin were “not fully prepared” (i.e., taken by surprise). I reckon he was mistranslated and that locals thought he said that the villagers “didn’t prepare properly.” Ouch.
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