Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Po-hsiung (吳伯雄) has been very dejected lately. His chairmanship is in jeopardy, and the internal fighting over the Straits Exchange Foundation chairmanship has angered him to be point that he has called those spreading the rumor that he will take over the post “bastards.”
Despite the constant internal strife, Wu has announced that he will travel to China to visit Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum early next month and then attend the KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forum in mid-July. He also said he might meet Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and will make a key statement there.
Ever since former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) began cooperating with the CCP in suppressing Taiwan after having been defeated in his second presidential run, the Chinese one-party dictatorship has pretended that the KMT-CCP forum is a vehicle for “peaceful development,” while using it as a platform for its united front strategy — with the KMT’s full support.
This bizarre phenomenon did not change with the transfer of power back to the KMT and its party-state regime. Instead, the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) with his goal of eventual unification has caused policy to lean completely toward China. Today, the KMT-CCP forum has become a direct channel for the KMT to collude in secrecy with Beijing and avoid any democratic oversight.
This confused view of who is friend and who is foe has ensnared Taiwan in China’s net. In particular, it is not only the mixed up view of friend and foe that is confused, domestic relationships are also steeped in confusion as the camp treats the opposition and even the general public as enemies.
When Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) visited Taiwan last November, protesters were deprived of their right to display the national flag and freedom to protest against an enemy state. Both protesters and reporters were treated brutally, leading Freedom House to say press freedom has regressed in Taiwan.
More seriously, Wu would rather toast Chinese leaders in Taiwan or China than interact with the opposition. Ma also sees domestic contradictions as a conflict between enemies. As the head of state, he should represent the general interests of the entire public. However, he acts more like a president for some, not for all. A year after coming to power, he even dropped his title to meet Chen, but he has yet to meet with the opposition leader for a heart-to-heart talk.
And most ridiculously, in terms of the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement between Taiwan and China, the government yields to Beijing while refusing to explain what the pact entails to the public. Domestic opposition could be a bargaining chip in cross-strait negotiations, but instead the government has suppressed its voice. Such a national leader is almost unimaginable.
Similarly, the opposition is also facing internal conflict. Next Sunday’s demonstrations are one example. The demonstration to “protest against Ma to protect Taiwan” is a public action and no one should insist on taking the credit for the entire campaign. Whether protesters gather on Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei or in Kaohsiung and support each other through videoconferencing, or if they demonstrate in several other locations, it will highlight the public’s worries and anger over the economic downturn, democratic decline, loss of sovereignty and the government’s incompetence.
But if organizers try to outshine one another, the world will surely think they are competing with each other. Contradictions among the general public are best handled based on unity.
Lu Shih-hsiang is an adviser to the Taipei Times.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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