Spurred by the hijacking of the freighter Maersk Alabama in the Gulf of Aden, influential US congressmen and pundits are urging their military to pursue the Somali pirates ashore, eradicating their coastal safe havens.
Would taking the offensive — striking at piracy at its source — represent wise strategy? Doubtful. The administration of Barack Obama should not undertake a land campaign without careful forethought about the fallout of even a successful effort.
Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz sagely counsels against taking the first step toward war without considering the last. A US expeditionary force might not be able to extricate itself from Somalia quickly or easily. This could be a protracted venture bearing uncomfortable resemblance to a counterinsurgency. If so, its costs could well outstrip any likely benefits, while its repercussions could damage US relations with fellow great powers like China and India.
History amplifies the point. One advantage that the government of president Thomas Jefferson’s day had was an enemy with a return address. The Barbary “pirates” against whom Jefferson deployed naval expeditionary forces in 1804 were pirates in name only. In reality they collected “tribute,” or protection money, for the petty rulers of Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis. This gave US forces — most notably a pick-up army of US Marines and their Arab allies — readily identifiable targets.
But Somali corsairs serve no lawful government. Coercing the weak regime in Mogadishu, whose control of Somali territory remains tenuous at best, would do little good. US forces would have to root out each pirate stronghold separately. A come-and-go strategy — raiding one coastal village then moving on to the next — wouldn’t be enough. The marauders would simply disperse into the countryside and regroup once the Americans had departed.
To achieve lasting results, the US would have to establish a lasting presence along the coast, amid the Somali populace — which is how counterpiracy could blur into counterinsurgency.
Unconventional warfare is something to which the Somali national character appears well suited. Author Mark Bowden of Black Hawk Down fame recounts the US troops’ bewilderment at Somali attitudes toward exchanges of gunfire during the 1992-1994 UN relief operation. US Army Rangers were authorized to fire when someone pointed a weapon at them, but such restrictive rules of engagement flouted reality. Somalis ran — en masse — toward the sound of the guns.
“Those with guns were intermingled with women and children,” reports Bowden of the 1993 battle between the Rangers and Somali militants. “The Somalis were strange that way. Whenever there was a disturbance in Mogadishu, people would throng to the spot: men, women, children — even the aged and infirm. It was like some national imperative to bear witness.”
Crowds multiply the chances of collateral damage and deaths that would embitter the populace against the US.
What about the larger diplomatic ramifications? China would likely oppose a sustained US campaign launched from international waters. Projecting power from the sea would stir up bad memories of the Opium Wars, the Boxer Rebellion and other painful episodes from China’s “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western naval powers. This would be especially true should the pirates skillfully portray US forces as abusive toward ordinary Somalis.
In turn, Beijing might dissociate itself from the counterpiracy effort at sea, gutting Washington’s hopes for a great-power maritime partnership in the Indian Ocean.
Similarly, India might shy away from counterpiracy on land. One reason New Delhi has been edgy about closer collaboration with the US Navy is that it fears being blamed for US actions. New Delhi regards itself as a kind of steward of security and order in the Indian Ocean region. If a US campaign went poorly — or if it went well, but at high human cost — it would reinforce the fears of Indian leaders that maritime cooperation with the US is a dicey venture.
India could squander its good name — and thus its claim to regional leadership — by bandwagoning with the US, even in a worthwhile cause like quelling piracy.
Statistically speaking, the threat of piracy seems too small to justify the military and diplomatic hazards of attacking pirates in their lairs. Few ships are falling prey to brigands despite the recent spate of high-profile attacks.
Remaining on the defensive, then, looks like the prudent strategy. Navies ought to keep patrolling the waters off Somalia, while shipping firms and governments arm merchantmen transiting the area. Self-help offers the least risky antidote to maritime anarchy.
James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own.
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