Taiwan’s national strength and status in the international community are not commensurate with those of a mature democracy and a highly developed economy. As a result, Taiwanese pay more attention to foreign affairs than people in many other countries. This is commendable and shows that the planning of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategies cannot be based solely on the ideas of a political elite, but also need to take into account the opinions of a population that possesses sufficient ability and interest to monitor the government’s diplomatic policies. These policies need to reflect the public consensus.
The diplomatic and cross-strait policies promoted by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) have garnered a great deal of attention both domestically and internationally. Given Taiwan’s diplomatic difficulties, the success of any diplomatic strategy relies on whether the government has plans in place that take both national interests and international moral standards into consideration.
Many people are questioning Ma’s “diplomatic truce” strategy. The administration must offer a clear definition of whether the truce constitutes the government’s major diplomatic strategy or if it is just one of their tactics. A clear definition is necessary because the difference between strategy and tactics cannot be confused — Taiwanese can easily judge the feasibility of the diplomatic truce and the success of the government’s overall diplomatic policies on events between Taiwan and China and with the rest of the world.
Given the problems that have plagued Taiwan’s diplomatic policy in the past, we must first establish the core values of a new diplomatic strategy.
First, diplomacy is part of a government’s overall policy and is inextricably linked to the welfare of the general public. Therefore all diplomatic actions should be aimed at promoting the interests of the nation and the public.
Second, diplomatic expansion cannot be judged based solely on an increased number of diplomatic allies. The true goal of diplomacy lies in fulfilling one’s responsibilities as a member of the international community. A nation’s diplomatic resources must not be wasted.
In addition, to be able to maximize Taiwan’s national security and promote its interests, we must understand that diplomatic and cross-strait policy are closely linked and complement each other. This makes it necessary to avoid vicious diplomatic competition with China. We must use these values as the standard when evaluating the success of the government’s diplomatic policy.
Based on what Ma said during his campaign and after taking office, the government’s main diplomatic strategy is probably a “flexible diplomacy,” with the diplomatic truce being a tactical part of that strategy. Past governments placed too much emphasis on bilateral diplomatic relations. A nation’s diplomatic strategy should include participation in bilateral diplomatic and multilateral international mechanisms, participation on a regional level, as well as substantial economic interactions, especially free trade agreements. A “flexible diplomacy” should be aimed at actively promoting Taiwan’s participation in every international sphere possible.
As for the tactics behind the diplomatic truce, it is easy to see that they are aimed merely at easing tensions in bilateral relations, which easily leads to vicious competition. The diplomatic truce should be used to prevent passivity and inaction and encourage action. Tactics are aimed at helping one reach one’s strategic goals and as a result, the diplomatic truce must be an expression of friendliness so as to help build an environment beneficial to regional security. We must let China and our diplomatic allies see the effort and sincerity we have put into the truce.
The diplomatic truce should also focus on the Taiwanese public. Taiwanese have a good awareness of democracy and insight into international society and they are fed up with Taiwan’s “money diplomacy.” Therefore, the diplomatic truce should also include non-traditional diplomatic aspects. Of course, it should also be in line with international moral standards for it to be able to achieve its ultimate goal of peace.
Ma’s new diplomatic policies have caused much doubt and opposition. The government therefore has a duty to explain its new diplomatic thinking to the Taiwanese public and the international community.
First, to deal with doubts about the diplomatic truce disclosing the government’s bottom line for negotiation too early on, the government should come up with a clear “roadmap” for the truce and make it clear that the tactics used are merely one path on their roadmap. The government should also demonstrate its sincerity from the outset so as to encourage China into giving us a friendly response.
Second, some people have questioned whether the diplomatic truce is overly passive, saying that apart from focusing on the truce, the government needs to be more proactive in unfolding Taiwan’s diplomatic plans by participating in more multilateral organizations or giving out more international humanitarian aid.
Third, some of the concerns surrounding the diplomatic truce have been caused by an uncertainty about China’s reaction. If China does not respond positively and continues to belittle Taiwan in the international community, the truce will become something we have used to belittle ourselves. To remedy this, the government must also make it clear that the truce is not the goal of our diplomatic policy — the goal of the truce is to create an environment beneficial to the development of Taiwan’s diplomatic space. If China’s response is not favorable to Taiwan, our allies will be able to see who the real “troublemaker” is and will support us in gaining wider international participation.
Fourth, the government’s diplomatic policy has been criticized as being excessively pro-China and for causing doubts amongst Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. The government therefore needs to explain that its new policies are based on its “flexible diplomacy” concept and aimed at avoiding a zero-sum game and creating a win-win situation for all parties concerned.
The government’s diplomatic strategy is aimed at maximizing Taiwan’s overall interests and dignity, so it also needs to fight for more international space for Taiwan while playing the role of a peacekeeper. Such moves will depend on Taiwan’s soft and hard power.
Taiwan needs to share with the international community and make contributions. This represents an embodiment of a soft power that can help Taiwan win international respect, while a determination to uphold Taiwan’s national sovereignty and security will help build a strong foundation for engaging in healthy competition with China.
Francis Yi-hua Kan is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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