Recently, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) rhetoric promoting cross-strait reconciliation has gradually shifted from “one China, different interpretations” to “the Chinese people,” perhaps in the hope of eventually settling upon a framework for a “Greater China.” This new challenge for the pan-green camp, which insists on Taiwanese independence, should perhaps lead them to consider the possibility of a three-way win-win situation through “Chinese Taiwanese independence.”
The term “the Chinese people” has two meanings and different interpretations. One meaning is the strict academic definition, as in the Schicksalgemeinschaft, or “community of fate,” which gradually developed from the end of the 19th to the 20th century. It is also the modern nation-state shaped by the state apparatuses of the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
For its part, nationalism is an ideology that advocates one nation, one state.
Yet, “the Chinese people” also has a colloquial meaning, as in the so-called huaren (華人), which roughly translates to “ethnic Chinese” and has implications for culture, locale and blood-ties, although not those of political states. The term huaren is also commonly interchangeable with zhongguoren (中國人), or simply “the Chinese.”
However, the pan-green camp has rejected the term “Chinese” and claims that Taiwanese are not Chinese, for the apparent reason that Taiwanese are not citizens of the PRC. In other words, this makes no distinction between the Chinese people and Chinese nationals. The deeper reason is related to the trend of de-Sinicization in Asian countries surrounding China.
Should it ever come to this, a successful move to Taiwanese independence would be contingent on a war supported by Japan and the US, as well as a shared hatred for the enemy. However, the price would be internal division, as the popularity of independence relies upon regarding the Chinese on the other side of the Taiwan Strait as the enemy.
For the politics of hatred to maintain its energy in daily life, an external enemy needs to be transformed into an internal enemy, so that a target of hatred — the enemy, or the Chinese — must be sought within Taiwan itself. In such a scenario, Taiwan would become a battleground between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, or Chinese and Taiwanese.
An era of cross-strait reconciliation may be upon us. The future of Taiwanese independence, however, cannot be based on the hope that cross-strait animosity will return; simultaneously, Beijing will not abandon its goal of annexation.
The future of Taiwanese independence therefore rests on reconciliation with the pan-blue constituency and the backing of Chinese nationals. This implies that the pan-green camp should reconsider the new route of “Chinese Taiwanese independence.”
This “Chinese Taiwanese independence” comes down to former senior presidential adviser Koo Kwang-ming’s (辜寬敏) statement that China and Taiwan are brotherly states, but rather than waiting until Taiwanese independence has been achieved to transform China from an enemy into a brother, the two countries should now start to see each other as family and recognize that Taiwanese are also huaren, zhongguoren and part of “the Chinese people.”
This could reduce the antagonism and lack of understanding harbored by Chinese nationals against Taiwanese independence and substitute hatred with love for our fellow nationals.
Furthermore, although “Chinese Taiwanese independence” insists on “eventual independence,” its “Chinese” flavor still provides room for dialogue with Beijing.
“Chinese Taiwanese independence” also shares a common foundation with the KMT’s “Chinese Taiwan,” as the latter concept already includes the possibility of its existence.
Zhongguoren, “the Chinese people,” and huaren have always existed in different countries. The people on both sides of the Strait are “Chinese people” and zhongguoren. But this does not mean that we cannot have one state on each side.
“Chinese Taiwanese independence” welcomes the new cross-strait situation by “seeking mutual survival through reconciliation” (a Democratic Progressive Party slogan) and “the preservation of differences through finding consensus” (a KMT slogan), and is worthy of serious consideration by the pan-green camp.
Ning Yin-bin is a writer.
Translated by Angela Hong
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