In the past eight years, the relationship between civil movements and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been ambiguous and complex. After controversies concerning the 84-hour-fortnight work schedule and demands for halting the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant during the early stages of the DPP’s terms in office, the party has consciously chosen a more conservative path.
This has been reflected in slogans such as “boost the economy” and those suggesting that social welfare must be temporarily put on hold. At some point, the DPP apparently lost the imagination required to become a different government, and was forced to adopt the old ways of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), thus declaring its own ideological surrender.
Even so, the DPP government still widened the channels of participation for civil movements: From the Presidential Office’s special task force for the promotion of gender mainstreaming and the Environmental Impact Assessment committee of the Environmental Protection Administration to the various committees under the Council of Labor Affairs, civil activists obtained the right of expression within the system.
The DPP’s tendency toward reform by half-measures, however, has also caused dejection among civil activists. For instance, there are times when civil groups find their attendance perfunctory, as those in higher positions have already determined policies. This causes the conflict between civil groups and the government to intensify. Protests from the Commission on Women’s Rights Promotion against a mandatory “period of reflection” prior to abortion and protests from environmental impact assessment committee members against the case of Formosa Plastics Group’s steel refinery are instances of such conflicts.
Now, through their elective victory, the KMT has put an end to this ambivalent period. Several factors will determine the future of civil movements after the reorganization of the political scene.
Judging from the current staff appointments in the new government, the re-instated KMT government will adopt its old route of developmentalism, focusing on economic growth and correspondingly relegating environmental protection, laborers’ rights and other social justice issues to the back burner.
This is not surprising. After all, the mainstay of KMT president elect Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) election platform was the revitalization of the economy. However, whether the results of social reforms that are already in place will be totally overthrown en route to “restorationism” will be worthy of attention.
In terms of education, the fate of the curricular guideline allowing the use of a variety of textbooks and policies of diversity in educational staff and entrance processes will be an obvious index.
Similarly, in the past eight years, labor rights groups have successfully blocked demands from employers for the abolishment of the minimum wage and the establishment of foreign-labor zones in which the Labor Standards Law (勞基法) would not apply. How will these issues develop?
Additionally, will the ideal of a “non-nuclear homeland,” which once won the consensus of the government and opposition parties alike, finally fall through?
Since winning the election, the KMT has taken a pragmatic attitude toward the renaming of the National Democracy Memorial Hall and Taoyuan International Airport. Civil activists now wait to see whether the same approach will be extended to other issues.
Second, how will the deposed DPP define its own position and its relationship to civil movements? Since losing the election, much internal criticism has been directed at the loss of progressive values, while some mention the center-left position and others propose the reestablishment of relations between the DPP and civil groups.
Before a new chairman is elected, however, these opinions could merely be advantageous statements made only for effect and not necessarily lead to any real change.
To civil activists, the past eight years have shown that the point is not what the DPP says, but what it is actually willing — and able — to accomplish.
After Ma’s inauguration on May 20, even if the DPP had the will to move left, its room for action would be severely limited by its legislative disadvantage. The party’s only chance is in the seven counties and cities in southern Taiwan. Unless local government officials demonstrate a new vision and recover their attentiveness to neglected voices, they will not win the trust of civil groups.
Finally, how can civil groups return to civil society and reestablish a foothold?
Existing government subsidies and policy-making channels may become constrained. Many social groups will have to both maintain the existence of their organizations and exert public influence.
And the current base of civil groups has already suffered severe losses. For instance, the crowds that assembled in the past for anti-nuclear demonstrations have all but vanished. After the legalization of the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions, demonstrations on International Workers Day also lack the force of years past.
A rare positive example is the movement to preserve the Lo Sheng Sanatorium. But even the rate of participation in demonstrations to save the leprosarium did not match those from the opposing side, organized by local Sinjhuang (新莊) representatives, demanding to push forward with the building of the MRT.
Successful civil movements in recent years, such as the demand for lower tax rates for corporations as promoted by the Alliance of Fairness and Justice, or the Youth Labor Union 95, which pushed for a rise in the minimum wage, did not rely on a widespread public foundation but on the clever manipulation of the media to generate momentum and force government officials to recognize the seriousness of the issues.
The long-term fallout from civil movements weakened by a lack of public support has yet to be seen.
No matter what paths the two major parties choose, the efforts of civil activists will be crucial. Unless civil movements survive, Taiwanese society will not continue to progress.
Ho Ming-sho is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of Sociology at National Sun Yat-sen University.
Translated by Angela Hong
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