Voters today participate in one of the nation's most important elections since it first directly elected its president in 1996. The election will essentially decide whether this new democracy can be deepened through better governance; it will also determine if Taiwan's newfound national identity can be consolidated through the referendum to enter the UN.
Voters will decide between Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) and his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) counterpart Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who are engaged in a race that has generally tilted in Ma's favor.
In light of significant differences between major popular polls, which make it extremely difficult to ascertain the salient political fissures that will determine the result, a more qualitative look at the issues and candidate platforms may offer a better idea of what has shaped the election campaign.
Following the crushing electoral defeat of the DPP in the legislative elections in January, the KMT now controls 81 to the DPP's 27 seats in the 113-seat legislature. Hsieh, a former premier and mayor of Kaohsiung, and Ma, a former mayor of Taipei, recently took part in two high-profile televised debates to test each other's claims to the presidency. In a two-way campaign that has focused more on mudslinging than policies, the debates provided a refreshing look at the candidates.
The debates helped show voters and concerned international observers where each candidate stands on national, international and cross-strait issues, and ultimately the direction in which Taiwan will move under the next president.
In these debates three variables emerged as defining parameters of this election: national identity, national security and national economic recovery. The central issue of the three remains national identity -- the sine qua non in how cross-strait relations have evolved over the past two decades, and a reason why Taiwan's economy, job environment and trade cannot be completely separated from cross-strait relations in domestic political debate.
The two candidates, as expected, disagreed on China and national security. Although some observers argue that the central issue of this campaign is the "domestic economy," the candidates' platforms on economic development, industrial growth, employment and even higher education revealed that their respective remedial policies are directly or indirectly related to their proposed solutions for the cross-strait imbroglio.
What are the similarities and differences in the candidates' policies?
1. National identity
Hsieh's conceptualization of Taiwanese national identity is inherently linked to Taiwanese statehood. To Hsieh and the DPP, Taiwan is a sovereign state with all the qualifications necessary for an independent nation, even if it is officially recognized as the Republic of China (ROC).
According to this perspective, the civil war between the ROC and the People's Republic of China (PRC) has long ceased. Also, to a great extent, the ROC has already "Taiwanized": Taiwan is the ROC and the ROC is Taiwan. Possessing ROC nationality is equivalent to Taiwanese identity. Therefore, Taiwan's future can only be determined by its 23 million citizens. In essence, Taiwan and China do not belong to each other, nor do they represent each other.
Hsieh claims he would be flexible in negotiating with the PRC on relations between Taiwan and China. Hsieh also endorses the referendums proposed by both the DPP and the KMT on UN entry.
To Ma, the issue of Taiwanese "national" identity is more complicated and still burdened by the legacy of the civil war. In Ma's mind, only the ROC is sovereign -- not Taiwan.
At the beginning of Ma's campaign, he claimed that Taiwan is the ROC, but then, after intervention by the old guard of the KMT, he quickly qualified this statement by saying that ROC is not just Taiwan. Ma thus not only separates "Taiwan" from the "ROC," but also distinguishes the "PRC" from "China." He wants to negotiate with China on the basis of the so-called "1992 consensus," conditional on what he coined as "mutual non-denial."
In facing DPP complaints that he is too pro-China and not sufficiently pro-Taiwan, Ma hastens to state that in his term as president, he would not engage in talk of unification with the PRC.
2. National security
The candidates' positions on national security are linked to how they define national identity.
Hsieh advocates defending Taiwan's sovereignty and independence without reservation, and he singles out China as the greatest security threat, with more than 1,300 missiles targeting Taiwan. He argues that given China's military modernization, Taiwan must maintain the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait by purchasing and maintaining an adequate defense budget of at least 3 percent of GDP. He also openly supports the US-Japan Security Pact as a harbinger of peace and stability for the Asia-Pacific region.
Hsieh presents himself as a cautious moderate who would keep the balance between national security and international support. He is eager to develop better relations with the US and consolidate Taiwan's cooperation with Japan, while making an effort to establish a framework for promoting stability with China. He even advocates what he calls a "symbiotic vision for cross-strait relations" for maintaining Taiwan's security. Through this, he hopes to develop two forms of consensus between Taiwan and China: one is "no immediate pressing need to solve the differences across the Strait"; the other is "democratic procedures in reaching a possible resolution."
To Hsieh, resuming a cross-strait dialogue can release tension and make peace possible.
Ma's treatise on national security and national identity has been criticized for lacking clarity and substance, which has a lot to do with Ma's ambiguous definition of the latter. He wishes to accommodate everyone by incorporating conflicting definitions of "Taiwan" held by the KMT, the DPP and even the Chinese Communist Party -- but pleasing no one in the end.
Ma maintains that "responsible" national security for Taiwan amounts to more than safeguarding the borders; it also includes cross-strait peace, regional stability and a prosperous domestic environment.
Ma outlined his "SMART" strategy for national security in a speech on Feb. 26 to the Association for the Promotion of National Security. He identified four pillars in Taiwan's national security: the soft power of economic globalization; military deterrence through a defensive capability; ensuring the status quo through a "three noes policy" -- no negotiations on unification, no pursuit of de jure independence and no cross-strait use of military force, along with the acceptance of the "1992 consensus" ("one China" with different interpretations); and restoring mutual trust and military cooperation with the US, mending relations with ASEAN, Japan and Korea and being a "peacemaking" member of the international community.
3. Economic ties with China
Hsieh and Ma share the view that Taiwan's economic development depends on further globalization of Taiwanese industry. Their approach differs, however.
Ma argues that a comprehensive connection with China is the single most important remedy and that developing a "cross-strait common market" is Taiwan's lifeline to remain globally competitive. Hsieh is more concerned with increasing economic pressure on Taiwanese industry resulting from China's rise, and therefore maintains that a gradual relaxation and opening of economic links with China better protects Taiwan's interests. He has raised the threat of unemployment, soaring real estate prices and reduced competitiveness of agricultural and manufacturing products once capital, labor and goods from China enter the Taiwanese market unfettered.
Ma advocates immediate direct air links between Taiwan and China, starting with weekend chartered flights, an expanded "small three links" program through which Taiwanese can travel to China, and finally regular cross-strait direct flights within a year. He welcomes Chinese capital in Taiwan's real estate market, cheaper labor, medical caretakers, agricultural commodities and Chinese tourists and supported recognition of Chinese university credentials for local matriculation. However, these policies were not accompanied by regulatory precautions, which made Ma an easy target for Hsieh's camp.
Hsieh said possible negative consequences of Ma's "one China" market model could include: increased unemployment among the working class; a reduction in the quality of medical services; a detrimental impact on the higher education market and increasing unemployment among teachers; the undermining of civil servant examinations; erosion of loyalty to Taiwan in government officials; and endangering consumer health and safety because of increased exposure to Chinese goods.
In response to these criticisms, Ma corrected his model and proposed another policy, the "three noes" platform: no Chinese agricultural products, no Chinese labor and no imports of "black-hearted" (dangerous or shoddy) consumer goods from China.
Hsieh, on the other hand, opts for relaxing the cap on Taiwanese business investment in China; expanding selected cross-strait charter flights; gradually opening Taiwan to Chinese tourists; and permitting Chinese investment in Taiwan's office building market, but prohibiting such investment in the residential market.
When the Hsieh camp challenged Ma's common market model, concerns were quickly raised among the different classes whose interests may suffer from unregulated entry of professionals, workers and agricultural products. Criticism and protests from middle class professional associations joined the concerns of workers and farmers after the second televised debate.
The presidential election is more than just a choice between two candidates' policies on relations with China. It's also about better governance and consolidation of democracy. In this regard, Hsieh and Ma have offered different directions for the future.
Will Hsieh's graded approach to China -- a function of a clearly defined national identity -- be more palatable with voters?
Or will Ma's simultaneous embrace of China's economic rise and distancing from its politics, combined with ambiguity on national identity, prove a better option for Taiwanese?
Michael Hsiao is executive director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies at Academia Sinica. A different version of this article appeared in this month's edition of China Brief.
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