With the presidential election and voting on the two UN referendums almost upon us, the public must not only choose a leader but also decide whether either or both of the referendums will pass.
Neither the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nor the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) can withdraw their sponsored referendums -- nor should they -- because doing so could mean losing votes in the presidential election.
In fact, the KMT doesn't even have to launch a boycott. This time, it can just remain silent and its supporters will follow the precedent of the legislative elections and refrain from voting in the referendums, thus invalidating them.
The DPP's original plan was to use the UN referendum bid to suggest that KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) doesn't love Taiwan. That way, even if the referendums were to fail, it would still be beneficial for the DPP. Unfortunately, the blow suffered by the DPP in the legislative polls was too heavy and the UN referendum bid no longer commands as much leverage in the presidential election.
If the UN referendums fail, China will turn on its propaganda machine and the international community will think that the people of Taiwan support unification with China. In an op-ed piece in the Liberty Times (Taipei Times' sister publication) on Sept. 2 last year, I proposed that the DPP call on its supporters to support both UN referendums to guarantee that at least one of them passes.
After the DPP's defeat in the legislative elections, this proposal is even more relevant.
The KMT proposed a referendum on returning to the UN using the name "Republic of China" (ROC), or "Taiwan," or any other practical title that would uphold the country's dignity.
Except for the suggestive word "returning," the KMT-backed referendum is not contradictory in any significant degree to the DPP-proposed referendum on joining the UN using the name "Taiwan." Supporting both referendums doesn't violate any core DPP values.
DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) has proposed that both the pan-green and pan-blue camps support both referendums. This shows his serious concern for Taiwan's future.
If Ma refuses the proposal, he might lose supporters.
If Ma were to agree to Hsieh's proposal, it would improve the public's impression of him. But if the referendum were to pass, most of the credit would go to Hsieh. The situation is different than when the UN referendums were first proposed, and making this concession will get the public's attention and benefit Hsieh.
If Ma did win the presidential election, either of the two UN referendums would act as a restraint on him from pursuing eventual unification.
This reasoning shows that supporting both referendums would not harm Hsieh. However, this does not constitute a political conspiracy. It is instead conducive to Taiwan's future, and thus hard for Ma to turn down.
If the DPP and the KMT join forces to support both referendums and make them both pass, the domestic and international views on Taiwan's sovereignty would be clarified. Even if China went on a rampage as a result, there's not much the US could do about it.
The KMT would be forced to return to the pro-localization ground. Although the DPP has lost an opportunity to put the KMT in its place, it is also being pressured to change its tactics as a result of facing a decisive battle with the KMT on domestic political issues.
Only by transforming and focusing on domestic politics will the DPP be able to tackle the new single-member district, two-vote electoral system and maybe even turn the current troubles into a presidential election win.
Jason Liu is a professor at the Department of Chemical Engineering at the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology.
Translated by Ted Yang
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