Mon, Dec 24, 2007 page8

• Why South Koreans voted for Lee

  • By Tsai Zheng-jia 蔡增家
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  As predicted by opinion polls before the elections, favorite Lee Myung-bak was elected as the 17th president of South Korea on Thursday. South Koreans are accustomed to big turnarounds just before presidential elections, but in this case the accusations against Lee of stock manipulation did not prevent him from winning.

  Lee's election is both politically and economically significant.

  From a political science perspective, the election of the opposition Grand National Party's (GNP) Lee marks the second peaceful transfer of power in South Korea, which has now truly become a mature democracy. From an economic point of view, the election of a modern CEO who worked at the construction unit of Hyundai also represents a great victory for industrializing forces.

  Forces for industrialization and democratization are clashing in South Korea.

  The forces for industrialization consist mainly of people from the old military dictatorship who follow the reindustrialization policy initiated by former dictator Park Chung-hee. This policy emphasizes the importance of economic development and industrial upgrading.

  The democratization forces consist mostly of people from the democratic reform movement who follow former president Kim Dae-jung's opposition to authoritarianism and stress the importance of democratic transition and social justice.

  But after South Korea was changed by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and after the democratic forces lead by Kim changed South Korea's economic system, the distinction between the industrial and the democratic forces became increasingly blurred. Thus, rather than saying that the election of Lee was the result of the industrialization forces coming out on top of the democratization forces, it would be more correct to say that his election was because of the return of conservative forces.

  Having gone through democratization and transition of power in the 1990s, East Asian countries saw a sudden wave of calls for the return of conservatism last year.

  Japan is one example: After experiencing a period of unrest in domestic politics and foreign affairs stirred up by the reformist faction during the tenure of former prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, in October, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda -- a representative of the conservative forces within the Liberal Democratic Party -- finally replaced Abe and returned the country to the conservative track of the 1990s.

  Something similar is happening in South Korea: After the presidencies of democratic reformers Kim and Roh Moo-hyun, the conservative GNP is back in power and will probably return the country to its past close relations with the US while distancing it from North Korea.

  But why have South Koreans voted for the restoration of conservatism? The two main reasons are the clashes between the government and the opposition during Roh's presidency and the extreme distortion of economic reform.

  After Roh came to power, he called for the removal of US military bases from South Korean soil and the relocation of the capital to Chungcheong. His request that the US remove its bases caused tension with Washington and the proposal to relocate the capital led to sharp conflict with the opposition.

  After tiring and costly debate, the issue returned to square one as if nothing had happened, with the South Korean public being the only victims.

  As a result, the political atmosphere continued to be uneasy and Roh became a lame duck president. It was only at this point the South Korean public realized that the authoritarian regime they had wanted so hard to overturn had been replaced by an obstinate and arrogant leader.

  Thanks to the success of Kim's structural reforms, the economy peaked during Roh's term of office. Roh enjoyed the fruits of Kim's successful economic reform, but toward the end of his presidency, he gradually deviated from the previous economic reform path. His economic policies laid particular stress on big enterprises and only benefited a small number of rich people.

  Despite outstanding economic performance and exports, domestic real estate prices soared and the wealth gap widened. This led the public to believe that the democratic reform faction, which had pledged to curb the political power of the nation's industrial conglomerates, was in fact not much different from the past authoritarian government.

  Two consecutive South Korean presidents from the democratic reform faction gradually turned their backs on past political ideals and blurred the distinction between themselves and the old conservative forces.

  This is the key reason why the North Korean card was ineffectual but the economic card was not. It is also the key reason why South Koreans gave up on the once well-respected democratic reform faction and voted to restore the conservative forces that they used to despise.

  Tsai Zheng-jia is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.

  Translated by Anna Stiggelbout and Ted Yang
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