US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates completed a six-day visit to Asia on Friday that included stops in China, South Korea and Japan.
If one were to examine the comments made by government officials in Taipei, or scan the Taiwan press coverage of the visits, one might be left with the impression that all eyes in Taiwan were focused on the Gates visit to China alone.
Did he take further steps toward "co-management" of the Taiwan issue with China? Did Gates or anyone on his delegation brief the traveling press that US policy was based on a "sincere desire to see reunification done in a peaceful manner?" Did Gates tip his hand one way or another regarding US decisions on pending arms sales requests from Taiwan?
While this attention among Taiwanese to Gates' visit to Beijing is quite understandable, it may also lead people in Taiwan to miss the real significance of the Asia visit.
In fact, Gates' visit to China was his least important stop in Asia by a long stretch -- not only from the standpoint of US interests, but for Taiwan's as well.
In case it has gone unnoticed (and I fear this is all too common in Washington), the US' alliances in Asia are increasingly stressed and troubled.
This is true with respect to ties with the Philippines and Thailand, but it is also true in Northeast Asia, where the vast majority of forward-deployed US forces are stationed. Downturns in the US alliances with South Korea and especially Japan will have a direct impact on Taiwan.
There are a number of reasons for the negative trends with our alliances.
This would certainly include the concerns cited by our friends that the US is suffering from a strategic preoccupation with another region of the world.
Our engagement with Asia is seen as episodic and often lacks senior-level involvement.
Increasingly, the US is viewed as inconsistent, lacking basic competence and potentially unreliable in the event of future conflict.
Other reasons have less to do with us and more to do with internal politics in each of these countries.
This is perhaps most true in South Korea, where many observers identify generational change in leadership as a major factor in South Koreans' evolving view of the US. While it is true the US-South Korean alliance was formed in blood and shared sacrifice, it is also true that very few of South Korea's leaders have personal memories of the battles where we stood shoulder-to-shoulder facing extraordinary hardship and violence.
More reasons still for stress on the alliances can be found in policy choices.
Leaders in both Seoul and Tokyo see direct missteps on the part of senior US policymakers that have contributed to troubles in the alliances.
Many South Koreans believe the US exacerbated tensions in the Korean Peninsula by refusing to speak directly with North Korea, while at the same time contributing to Pyongyang's fears and insecurities by designating them a member of the "axis of evil," then attacking a co-member of that same club for suspected weapons of mass destruction programs.
Many in South Korea also believe the US has issued repeated statements of no-confidence in Seoul's ability to manage intra-Korean affairs, and to creatively and effectively engage the North.
How bad have things become in our alliance? Recent polls suggest that more South Koreans cite the US as a threat to their security than North Korea.
With respect to Japan, ardent supporters of the alliance in Japan are both puzzled and irritated by a number of missteps and slights coming from Washington.
Many in Japan viewed the congressional resolution on comfort women as a gratuitous slap at Tokyo.
Many feel that the refusal to discuss the export of F-22s to Japan is not a genuinely global restriction, but rather a statement of low trust in Tokyo's abilities to protect sensitive technology.
And worst of all, most informed observers in Japan feel that the US has ignored Japan's interests in the six party talks as North Korea has by-passed Japan as a consultative partner in these same proceedings in favor of Beijing.
How do we know that confidence in the alliance may be slipping in Japan? For the first time since the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it is no longer taboo in Japan to publicly argue in favor of Japan acquiring an independent nuclear weapons capability.
US bilateral alliances have been the major contributor to peace and stability in Asia for more than 50 years.
Of equal importance going forward, these alliances also carry the potential for constructive global engagement that could promote a broad set of interests from which all democracies and free peoples everywhere would benefit.
Weaker alliances thus risk not only instability in Asia, but also represent a tremendous waste of potential.
Japan is the most important partner to the US in Asia.
This is true not because Japan has the second-largest economy in the world, or because it is the second most generous contributor to the outside world in development assistance after the US, and not because it is the second only to the US in terms of financial contributions to international organizations such as the UN.
Japan is the most important partner to the US in Asia because our treaty agreement allows for US forces to be forward deployed on Japanese soil to be employed throughout the Asia-Pacific region as deemed necessary by US leaders.
Given the tyranny of time and distance across the vast Pacific Ocean, this is the only arrangement for the foreseeable future that can give the US the ability to affect security throughout the entire region.
This sphere very much includes the Taiwan Strait.
None of these aforementioned observations is to suggest that Gates' China stop was not important.
It is just to say that it pales in comparison with the magnitude of the stops in Seoul and in Tokyo. Further, while it would be unfair to say the stop in China was unimportant, it would be fair to say it was uninteresting.
Gates himself identified accomplishments from the visit to China to include agreements to "expand the military-to-military relationship," to promote "exchanges from military education institutions, exchanges of mid-level and junior level officers, visits of senior officials" and gain "their help on POW/MIA issues."
Gates said there were discussions that focused on the need for greater transparency from China given the pace and scope of China's military modernization, and the hope for bilateral confidence-building measures. And naturally, Gates said he and his Chinese interlocutors spent "a fair amount of time on Taiwan."
The US-China bilateral military relationship is reminiscent of the American movie Groundhog Day, in which the main character wakes up each and every day to find he is living the same day over and over again. Gates is not articulating the wrong agenda for the US-China military relationship.
But we should note that he is articulating the same modest, limited agenda that has been in place for close to 20 years.
The relationship between the US Department of Defense and the People's Liberation Army is either frozen in time, or it is once again bumping up against the limitations imposed by an environment created by two parties who share little trust, and very few complementary objectives (as is more often the case, our objectives are diametrically opposed in the military-to-military exchanges).
But the relationships between the US and South Korea, and the US and Japan are not static ? they are very dynamic -- and unfortunately facing challenges at this juncture.
Success in Seoul and Tokyo for Gates will be a shared success throughout Asia.
These are the challenges and events that should capture more time and attention from people in Taiwan.
Randall Schriver is a former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and a founding partner of Armitage International.
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