After what seems to have been a laborious process, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has finally released its list for legislator-at-large nominations, and yet the choice of candidates indicate that the KMT had to compromise in order to settle conflicts in electoral districts.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will also have to produce a list of candidates soon. This is all evidence that the position of legislators-at-large and their constitutional role have long been ignored, and a problem that political parties should address while choosing their candidates.
In order to strictly monitor whether the DPP's legislators-at-large are working to implement its agenda, the party drew up a set of guidelines for legislators-at-large. The DPP also amended its nomination regulations, stipulating that any legislator-at-large nominees violating the party's will should immediately be disqualified. This shows that the legislator-at-large function has had to yield to party interests.
The parties have not tried to keep a low profile as they revamp the legislators-at-large role, which is a reflection of the general view among the parties that these positions are simply a party tool.
On Dec. 30, 1993, the Council of Grand Justices issued an interpretation of Article 49, Paragraph 2, of the Public Officials Election and Recall Act (公職人員選舉罷免法) which states: "To those elected pro rata based upon the votes won by each political party, the provisions governing recall procedure are not applicable" on whether that exclusion is in conflict with the Constitution and thus null and void.
The grand justices determined that the constitutional role of legislator-at-large "is to ensure that a certain portion of congressmen, while they are exercising the power conferred, do not yield to the will of regional voters in particular precincts, so that they may learn the genuine will of the people as a whole and preserve national interests; in addition, said articles also are meant to prompt political parties to nominate the most talented, virtuous and reputable members to be said congressmen ? so that such congressmen may serve their country."
The interpretation expounded the rationale of legislators-at-large, which is to "learn the genuine will of the people as a whole and preserve national interests," rather than to learn the party's will and preserve its interests.
The legislator-at-large post has its origins in the spirit of proportional representation. The concept was devised by French socialist Victor Prosper Considerant in 1892. He said the proportional representation system conforms better to the public's will and could correct the injustice of sacrificing the opinion of minority groups which occurs in majority representation systems.
The key spirit of party proportional representation through legislators-at-large is to stand on the side of minorities and disadvantaged groups and allow popular rule rather than party rule, replacing the majority rule emphasized in majority representation systems.
Strangely, while placing so much importance on the implementation of party will, the value of doing so is immediately denigrated if it goes counter to the party's own interests. For example, the DPP was strongly opposed to proportional representation in the Referendum Review Committee (RRC) and the National Communications Commission (NCC), which are both composed according to the proportion of each party's representation in the legislature.
The reason for the DPP's opposition was described by Cabinet Spokesman Shieh Jhy-wey (謝志偉) when he said that the RRC was composed according to each party's proportional representation, and thus represents the party's position. The Cabinet also said that proportional representation in the NCC would turn it into yet another political battlefield.
In other words, the DPP opposes letting the party's will suppress the general will of the people, but when it comes to the nomination of legislator-at-large candidates, it relies on the party will to violate the idea that it should "learn the genuine will of the people as a whole."
Nearly all of Taiwan's political parties are alike in trying to build a "party-state" by highlighting their definition of the legislator-at-large function. Yet this is different from Germany, which, tries to advance party status, while strictly regulating the notion of the "party-state." Taiwan's parties only choose to follow the former and ignore the latter.
Unless this selective interpretation is changed, the political parties would not be able to move democracy forward, but are instead likely to become another source of conflict.
Eugene Yen is a part-time assistant professor in the School of Liberal Education at Shih Chen University.
Translated by Ted Yang
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