Wed, Aug 08, 2007 page8

• The strategy and logic of the US' Asia policy

  • By Sushil Seth
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  Sometimes it is difficult to understand the logic of the US' Asia policy. At one level the US is committed to prevent any other power from challenging its supremacy. In Asia, China is clearly seen as a strategic competitor, if not a rival. Therefore, a policy of containing China, even if it is not put that directly, is taking shape.

  The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance is clearly a part of that strategy. Australia, a strong US ally, is being incorporated into it as part of a trilateral security structure; even though Canberra feels the need to emphasize that the expanded security relationship is not directed against China.

  India's induction into this trilateral structure is developing into a quadrilateral arrangement, obviously reinforcing China's worries about a ring of containment around it under the US leadership.

  Even as the US is strengthening its regional security architecture with these arrangements, it is also sending contrary signals about its commitment to the region in general. For instance, Washington has sought to sideline the ASEAN as a regional organization.

  US President George W. Bush has canceled a scheduled summit meeting with ASEAN leaders in Singapore. And US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice decided not to attend another ASEAN ministerial meeting.

  By doing so the US is not only snubbing ASEAN and its leaders, it is also signaling a waning of US interest in the region. The multiple problems in the Middle East are consuming all US energies, leaving it very little time to devote to Asia.

  China has already made important political and economic inroads into the ASEAN countries. With a perceived lack of US interest and commitment to the region, these countries have no choice but to acclimate themselves to the `reality' of China's power.

  But the emergence of a quadrilateral regional security system under US leadership is clearly an indication that the US is not planning to let China have its way in Asia.

  There is, however, a view that Japan might not want to become part of a US strategy to contain or confront China. According to Mike Mochizuki, a specialist in US-Japan relations, there are two imperatives which "are likely to steer the Japanese government toward keeping relations with China cordial and stable. The first is the commercial imperative [as] Japan's own economic fortunes are now increasingly tied to the continuing expansion of the Chinese economy."

  And the second reason is "the strategic imperative." Mochizuki argues: "Although Japan is now strengthening its security alliance with the United States, it wants to avoid an international situation in which it has to choose between its alliance with the United States and stable relations with China."

  The point though is that Japan might not have that choice unless it is prepared to become part of China's sphere of influence. It is difficult to see Japan accepting a subordinate role; while Beijing is unlikely to share its primacy in Asia with Japan.

  Besides, they have unresolved maritime disputes involving access to potential oil and other mineral resources. At the same time, there is the highly contentious issue of Japan's wartime guilt, which is, in some ways, becoming the litmus test of their relationship.

  In the circumstances, it is quite a stretch to believe that China and Japan might be able to work out a stable relationship even as the US-Japan security alliance is constantly being reinforced and strengthened.

  Tokyo's worst nightmare would be if the US and China were to come closer, further adding to its sense of insecurity. The US-Japan alliance is Japan's security blanket against China's rise and ambitions. Indeed, China is now regarded as a security threat.

  Harking back to Nixon's 1972 China visit, Japan's worries on this ground are not entirely groundless.

  The question, though, is how real is the prospect of a US-China strategic convergence?

  There is an influential view within the US that China's rise might not be all that bad, and that a peaceful accommodation between an established superpower and an emerging one is not only possible but even desirable.

  The general argument would go like as Professor David Shambaugh has put it, "All nations in the region, including the United States, must adjust to the various and complex realities presented by China's ascent. It is not intrinsically something to be feared or opposed, although many may wish to hedge against potentially disruptive consequences."

  This sort of general statement for peaceful readjustment of regional political and security architecture is unexceptionable? But how do you sort out the myriad real and potential sources of conflict, like say the question of Taiwan and North Korea?

  On Taiwan, for instance, China won't budge from its position that Taiwan is China's territory. By that logic, wouldn't China have a right to annex Taiwan at any time? Would the logic of peaceful regional readjustment require the US to accept that?

  As for North Korea, Pyongyang is demanding a high price for nuclear non-proliferation.

  The question then is this: how far is the US prepared to go to achieve a final outcome of nuclear disarmament? And how far will China go to facilitate this?

  Also, how to assure China that the developing security structure between the US, Japan, Australia and India is not directed against it?

  There are, therefore, many pressure points which go against a smooth and stable new regional order. Or, as Professor Robert Sutter points out, "Alternatively, the United States may over time move away from its insistence on maintaining the dominant strategic position in Asian and world affairs."

  Which, in his view, "could set the stage for a different kind of Sino-American accommodation, with the United States pulling back strategically from Asia as China rises to regional leadership."

  The signs so far are that the US is not likely to walk away from the Asia-Pacific region as it has too many political, economic and strategic interests. But Washington does sometimes give the appearance of a half-hearted commitment which is only likely to bolster China's position.

  Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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