Fri, Jun 08, 2007 page8

• When a budget has no defensers

  • By Thomas Huang 黃維幸
  • • 
    • 
    • 

  Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) legislators have tied the passage of the draft amendment of the Central Election Commission Organic Law (中央選舉委員會組織法) to the annual budget bill. This has meant that the budget bill has been stuck in the legislature's Procedure Committee for more than six months without review. This violates the Budget Act (預算法), which stipulates that the legislature has to finish its review at least one month before the beginning of the fiscal year.

  The government and the opposition think they can fall back on the method used for last year's budget, which allowed "regular expenses" such as salaries to be appropriated anyway. Pan-green-camp legislators do not seem to sense an acute constitutional crisis on the horizon and have no plans to apply for a constitutional interpretation. Pan-blue-camp legislators, on the other hand, think their refusal to review the budget is reasonable because of their legislative autonomy, and they feel no shame at seeing the government descending into near anarchy.

  The refusal to review the budget is not simply a legal matter involving the Budget Act, but rather amounts to a constitutional crisis.

  Without a budget, the government will be unable to carry out its duties. Even if the budget from two years ago were used, that would just be an interim response. Even a child can understand that after a period of time the government would once again grind to an administrative halt. What that child might not understand, however, is the warped reasoning of one of my colleagues who says that the problem arises from legislative autonomy and the separation of powers.

  The legislature's autonomy is based on the idea that, in a representative political system, the legislature exercises sovereignty as a representative of the public, and that it should enjoy the greatest possible autonomy in the exercise of its rights and duties.

  This includes the legislature deciding on most of the internal procedures that best serve this goal.

  Thus, the question of whether or not to review the budget bill, how to review it and how much time it should take to review it are determined by the legislature itself. If the political environment causes a bill to stall in the legislature indefinitely, the principle of the separation of powers means that no other government agencies have the right to intervene.

  If the separation of powers and legislative autonomy can be interpreted in this way, then most governments would have expired a long time ago.

  Separation of powers does not mean isolation of powers, nor does it mean that the balancing of power is the only task. In addition to creating a power balance, there must also be cooperation between organs of state to maintain the health of the constitutional system.

  Since there is separation of powers, each organ has inalienable rights provided by the Constitution, as well as constitutionally determined duties.

  As far as the budget bill is concerned, this means that the legislature -- in addition to following the budget law -- is also constitutionally responsible for reviewing the budget.

  Any theories of legislative autonomy can only be aimed at realizing the spirit of the Constitution and maintaining constitutional procedures. Germany's constitutional court has warned several times that putting the cart before the horse will hamper the core of administrative power and bring the government to a standstill.

  Of course, the legislature does not have to accept proposals advanced by the Cabinet. The Constitution gives the legislature the right to topple the government through a vote of no-confidence.

  So why is the legislature so afraid to exercise this right? Instead, we are treated to a constant push for proportional representation in the Central Election Commission, something that is not provided for anywhere in the Constitution.

  On the one hand, the opposition is coveting executive power, while on the other hand it is afraid that the president will dismiss the legislature if it topples the Cabinet, which would result in a new election and the risk of losing one's seat.

  This is ultimate selfishness, not working for the public interest.

  At one point during the Clinton administration, the US Congress did not pass the budget bill, which nearly resulted in the government being unable to pay salaries.

  No one accused Congress of violating the US Constitution. Why? The crisis was too short to cause impatience among the public and the legal community. Most importantly, the US Constitution clearly stipulates that the budget bill is proposed by the US House of Representatives and reviewed and passed by Congress, leaving the administration without a basis on which to intervene.

  Taiwan's Constitution, on the other hand, stipulates that the Cabinet propose a budget bill that the legislature must review. At worst, the legislature can pass a budget that is unacceptable to the Cabinet, which would force the premier to step down, or suggest that the president dismiss the legislature.

  But there is no rationale that would rationalize the present situation, in which the budget bill is kept hostage in the legislature. The handling of the budget in the US and Taiwan are completely different situations.

  Maybe the ruling and oppositions parties will reach a compromise, but review of the budget is fundamental in determining whether or not democratic constitutional procedures can be carried out smoothly. What happens to good governance if legislators stick to their guns until the end of the three-year legislative term?

  The ruling party is willing to fight to the end and ask for constitutional interpretations on other, more politically volatile cases. But on the major issue of the stalled budget, it is satisfied with negotiations behind closed doors in the hope that they will one day be able to pass the budget.

  How can anyone consider this to be reasonable?

  Thomas Huang is a professor at Shih Hsin University's School of Law.

  Translated by Lin Ya-ti
• Most Popular

  • 1

    Napoli’s title hopes shaken by late Genoa equalizer

  • 2

    Privately owned city in Kenya taking on corrupt officials

  • 3

    MOE to encourage foreigners to work in Taiwan

  • 4

    Kane tastes first title as Bayern bid farewell to Mueller

  • 5

    Taiwan celebrates V-E Day for first time