Has US policy toward Taiwan changed? Three major developments at the US State Department between May 1 and May 4 have drawn considerable attention.
First, the 2007 joint statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee on May 1 made no mention of "encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" contained in the 2005 report.
Second, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte testified to the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs that Taiwanese politicians were attempting to change the status quo, including changing the national title, pushing for referendums and constitutional reform.
Third, American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young said at a press conference that the US does not support Taiwan developing long-range offensive missiles. Academics and politicians in Beijing believe this is the result of improvements in China-US and China-Japan relations, but I believe exactly the opposite -- that this reaction has been caused by heightening China-US tensions, and that it is a measure to relieve those strains.
The US security relationship with China has run into trouble. To cool things down, the US needs to take the lead in making a unilateral, friendly gesture. The difficulty is that neither side intends to attack, but each side worries that a potential conflict of interests could trigger one. To increase its feeling of security, one country boosts its defensive capabilities. This in turn generates concerns that it could be preparations for an attack.
So the two sides begin an arms race and strategic competition, as well as a search for allies for insurance.
The primary evidence of the problems in US-China relations lie in anti-terror efforts. The US has used the war in Afghanistan to extend its power into west and central Asia. China has also cited terror concerns as the reason for establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a gathering of members such as Russia and other central Asian countries. The US then took another step by using the Iraq War as an attempt to control Middle East oil. China then began its "string of pearls" strategy -- an effort to control key locations throughout Asia -- to ensure the security of its oil shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean to southern China.
When the US strengthened its atomic energy cooperation with India -- one example of strategic partnership -- China also worked on similar cooperation with India. When the US and Japan strengthened their military alliance in response to North Korea's nuclear test, China issued a warning with an anti-satellite missile test. When US-North Korea relations began to improve, China tried to establish a military hotline with South Korea. When the US, Japan and India held joint military exercises in eastern Japanese waters, China, Russia and other members of the SCO resolved to hold joint exercises of their own in August. All of this demonstrates difficulties in the US-China security relationship.
If the situation escalates, it could turn into a crisis, then into a conflict. The US believes China's strategy could one day lead the two sides into a major crisis, especially over Taiwan. Research from the Rand Corporation, a US think tank, shows that not only has China formed an "anti-intervention strategy" for the Taiwan Strait, but its ability to implement it is increasing. The objective of this tactic is to delay the time that US forces will take to enter the Taiwan Strait. The conflict would be over before the US could arrive, and the reality of the situation would force the US to accept the new "status quo."
As this would lead to catastrophe for both sides, the US isn't willing to play chicken over Taiwan. That wouldn't be in its interests, so it is trying to calm things down.
It wants to resolve the animosity before China can deploy its anti-intervention strategy, and it is doing so by reducing China's agitation over Taiwan. This is the reason for the US' recent actions.
Although the US acts friendly toward China over Taiwan, that doesn't mean Taiwan's strategic importance to the US has decreased. The US intention to establish a US-Japan-Australia-India security partnership in Asia was made plain in this year's consultative committee report. It's very possible that the US will temporarily push Taiwan to the side to resolve internal doubts over the alliance in Australia and India, as well as external obstructions from China and Russia.
It may be next year by the time the group is completed, and Taiwan's new domestic political situation would already be set. Then the US could adjust the role that Taiwan should play in its Asia strategy.
Emerson Chang is director of the Department of International Studies at Nan Hua University.
Translated by Marc Langer
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