Once again, the US president has come up short in Latin America. Granted, President George W. Bush was well received by the five countries he visited, with traditional Latin American hospitality and cordiality. There were no major, unfortunate incidents; the constant protests were strident but not especially violent or well-attended; no significant slights or mishaps took place; and Bush achieved what he probably was most interested in: Sending a message back to the US that he actually is interested in more than Iraq.
He also accomplished, in a somewhat round-about way, another goal: showing the flag, so to speak, in the face of the mounting challenge from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who, thanks to virtually unlimited supplies of oil money and Cuban foot-soldiers and doctors, is riding high across Latin America.
Chavez baited Bush at almost every stop along the way, but the US leader evaded the provocations, and indeed, probably bested Chavez in the sense that an unpopular US president managed to dominate the agenda and take the battle of ideas directly to Latin American audiences, with whom the Venezuelans and the Cubans are in contact every day. Bush was also able to partly change the tone of the US message in the hemisphere: From free trade and fighting terrorism, to combating poverty and strengthening democracy and human rights. If Bush had made this trip several years ago, things would be different today.
But everyone would also be in better shape today if Bush had been able to actually deliver on the main issues his interlocutors took up with him. Here, despite the photo-ops and the hugs and the local cuisine, the US president was simply not ready, willing or able, to give satisfaction to his colleagues, from capital to capital.
In Brazil, President Luiz Ignacio da Silva Lula's main issue, demand and hope was for a reduction or elimination in the US tariff on ethanol imports. Bush said no, since the tariff is congressionally mandated, and thus greatly diluted the importance of the bio-fuel cooperation agreement the two governments signed. In Uruguay, President Tabar Vasquez went out on a limb simply by hosting Bush, given that his problems with his Chavez-friendly neighbor in Argentina, President Nestor Kirchner, can only worsen as a result of these "dangerous" acquaintances.
Vasquez needed some cover on the status of Urugayan immigrants in the US, and mainly, increases in quotas for its exports to the US market. Again, Bush left him hanging.
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was happy just to have a US chief of state visit Bogota. The last one to do so was former US president Ronald Reagan in 1982. In fact, Bush's was a brave gesture: despite Uribe's success in combating drugs, paramilitaries and guerrillas, his capital is not an especially safe place.
Bush also gave him his backing on human rights concerns, which, coming from the gentleman responsible -- in the eyes of most of the world -- for Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, is perhaps damning with faint praise. But most disappointingly for Uribe, though understandably, the US president was unable to bring with him guaranteed congressional support either for Colombia's Free Trade Agreement with the US, nor funding renewal for the so-called Plan Colombia.
In Guatemala, once again, President Oscar Berger was obviously proud to receive Bush, but failed to obtain a commitment from him to stop the inhuman, hateful Homeland Security raids by US law enforcement officers against undocumented immigrants, exemplified by the detention and attempt at deportation, on the eve of Bush's visit, of nearly 300 Guatemalans working at a Massachussetts military vest factory.
Where Bush fared best, perhaps, was in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon not only received him as the gracious host Mexican presidents always are -- though he rightly slammed his guest on the fence the US is building here and there along the two countries' border -- but got in return what he needed, and wanted most. The US made a firm, explicit and apparently sincere commitment to lobby as strongly as possibly for what he calls "comprehensive immigration reform" and what in Mexico is commonly known as "the whole enchilada."
Whether Bush can deliver the goods is obviously open to question, but since US Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid traveled to Mexico City two days later to make the same commitment, it seems that Mexico's six years of vain efforts might finally prove fruitful. Needless to say, Calderon was thrilled, particularly because he had begun backing away from the emphasis former president Vicente Fox placed on the immigration issue.
Conversely, if Bush cannot come up with enough Republican moderates in the US Senate -- they are actually already there, probably -- and in the US House of Representatives, the letdown and resentment in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America will be immense.
So where do the US and Latin America go from here? Several crucial decisions lay ahead. The first is for the US and the rest of the region to wholeheartedly support, and if possible reinforce, the democracy and human rights protection instruments developed over the years, given the precarious nature of democracy and respect for human rights in nations like Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and others.
Second, the White House must not only get the pending free trade agreements ratified by Congress, but should improve them, learning from the North American Free Trade Agreement experience, make them more poverty-sensitive, more environmentally -- and labor-oriented, and provide more support for infrastructure and training.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Bush has to finally achieve the immigration reform he has promised for so long. Stop building fences -- even if they do make good neighbors -- and cease the harassment of undocumented people in the US. It's hateful, needless, and futile: as Bush said himself, the US will never, could never, and should never deport 12 million people, illegal or not.
Jorge Castaneda, former Mexican foreign minister, is professor of politics and Latin American studies at New York University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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