Sadly, if predictably, the US State Department has expressed disapproval at the Chen administration's late foray into the symbolism of nation-building as an act of aggression against its beloved -- and fictional -- cross-strait "status quo."
But now it seems that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her China-friendly underlings may not need to be so fearful of the changes that have been made to the titles of a number of Taiwanese state-owned firms or institutions.
The change to the names represents an assertion of Taiwanese sovereignty, and it is this assertiveness that riles Beijing, irritates the pan-blue camp in Taiwan and unnerves the State Department. It is also "angering" unions for the affected organizations, though in many cases the union hierarchies are de facto vehicles of pro-unification political parties anyway.
Change is often a good thing, and in the case of state-owned enterprises and agencies, changing names to reflect the reality and justice of Taiwanese self-determination should have been inevitable. Indeed, it should have happened within months of President Chen Shui-bian (
Better late than never? Not necessarily.
The question now is whether change that is effected in an incompetent or cowardly fashion is desirable if it produces a result that is even more symbolically confusing, even to the point of embarrassment, than what came before.
Here are the changes so far. Chinese Petroleum Corp (
The Chinese-language names for the two feature Taiwan prominently, but the English versions stupidly retain references to China in their English abbreviations, and even more laughably, duplicate the word "corp" if the abbreviations are spelled out.
Meanwhile, the central bank, or "Central Bank of China, Republic of China (Taiwan)" in full, has become the "Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)," which is so "status quo" in form that State Department officials are entitled to breathe a sigh of relief. Perhaps one less China of two in a title means something to some people.
The only sensible change so far was that made to the Chunghwa Post Co (
Some have described these tortured new names as compromises, which is true enough. Companies are loath to change long-established logos and risk loss of business through perceived erosion of brand recognition. And such concerns could only be amplified by the confusing addition of commas into the full titles of the companies.
Nonetheless, if these changes had to be done -- and at some expense and political risk -- then they should have been done properly. The sensible alternative titles for the first two companies are Taiwan Petroleum Corp and Taiwan Shipbuilding Corp, but it seems we might have to wait a long time for these to make an appearance.
All of this is a shining example of the mess that results when people of some vision but less competence entrust the important task of updating company titles to bureaucrats who treat the English language -- and those who use it to learn about Taiwan -- like an old football.
As such, it is a further reminder of the abyss that separates the well-meaning rhetoric of the Chen administration from the reality of its incompetence.
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