Competition for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nomination for the presidency is heating up. There are four likely contenders -- Vice President Annette Lu (
On his recent trip to Washington, Hsieh said he would run in the DPP primary, which is scheduled for April. Despite his loss in December's Taipei mayoral election, Hsieh's ability to broaden the DPP's base in the city and his contribution to the party's razor-thin victory in Kaohsiung are significant. Moreover, he has distanced himself from Chen and pursued what he calls "reconciliation and coexistence," which has earned him public support.
Su's struggle to distance himself from Chen amid allegations of corruption related to Chen, his close aides and his family, has been interpreted as an attempt to "take his own road."
Su has shown strong ambition to appeal to voters in the middle by proposing measures to open cross-strait relations. To some extent, Su supports Chen -- as when he stood by Chen's application for a constitutional interpretation on the trial of the presidential "state affairs fund." Yet Su is shifting toward the middle ground.
There is no doubt that, after the Taipei mayoral election, Hsieh's popularity has caught up with Su. The two are the front-runners in the race for the DPP nomination. But because of the party's primary system, both of them must take into account its voting formula -- direct election by party members counts for 30 percent of the vote and a public poll counts for 70 percent. Both could change their campaign strategies to strike a balance between seeking support within the party and appealing to the general public.
For Lu and Yu, both have been characterized as able to garner more support from the pan-green camp's core voters. Compared with Lu, Yu's capacity as chairman has more leverage to consolidate internal support.
Despite signals that the four are starting their campaigns, none has presented a vision of how to lead the country back onto the right track.
A combination of factors has contributed to a decline in the DPP's popularity in the past seven years. The failure to develop an effective approach to cross-strait relations and to work with the pan-blue opposition; the failure to rejuvenate a slowing economy and to strengthen the financial system with capable economic leadership; and a tendency toward corruption and the failure to reduce crime have eroded the party's popularity.
These factors undoubtedly constitute the greatest crises of Chen's presidency and the DPP government. They have also eroded internal support. The pan-blue camp's stubborn boycott of everything Chen proposes has ceased to be a legitimate excuse for the government's poor performance.
Checks and balances by the opposition are part of the political process, and it is up to voters to decide whether they make sense. However, at a time when Chen's presidency is about to end, the most lethal wounds are coming from within the party. The DPP primary provides an essential arena for all competitors to present their vision to improve both the party and the country.
A dirty campaign marked by finger-pointing among the four candidates would only hurt the DPP. A candid, frank and open-minded internal decision on who is the best candidate is necessary.
However, Chen cannot make this decision. It must be up to the democratic primary system to make the call. And everybody should accept the final outcome.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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