A dictator's sudden death usually triggers political instability. But it is doubly dangerous when it poses a risk of regional destabilization and a scramble for influence among the world's greatest military powers.
The sudden death last month of Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan's authoritarian president-for-life who declared himself "Turkmenbashi" (Leader of all Turkmens), jeopardizes stability in an increasingly important supplier of energy to Europe. Worse, the absence of a clearly designated successor and the weakness of civil society and other political institutions could have repercussions across Asia.
Indeed, Niyazov's demise highlights the broader problems of Central Asia's post-Soviet regimes, which, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, are run by Soviet-era bosses who, while not nearly as eccentric or egomaniacal as Niyazov, tolerate little dissent or opposition.
Most of them are old, some of them are unwell. So, in the next few years, Central Asia will face leadership change on many fronts, with security apparatuses -- which, as in Turkmenistan, have been crucial to buttressing these countries' regimes -- likely to be important players.
How these transitions turn out will matter for several reasons. First, Central Asia is an important source of energy. The Caspian region accounts for 2 percent to 3 percent of the world's known oil resources. While far smaller than the deposits in Saudi Arabia or Iran, Caspian oil could prove important if oil production falls or is reduced for political reasons elsewhere.
Much of this oil is in Kazakhstan, giving that country a critical role in the regional energy market. Moreover, Kazakhstan's strategic importance has increased as aresult of recent revelations that the country's Kashagan oil field will produce 25 percent more than initially expected at peak production.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are also major exporters of natural gas. Russia depends heavily on Turkmen gas, which could prove vital as demand rises over the next decade.
Second, Central Asia's leadership transitions could tempt outside powers to exploit the resulting instability and spark a struggle for influence. Because the region was part of both the Soviet Union and the Russian empire, President Vladimir Putin's Kremlin regards it as part of Russia's natural sphere of influence. Putin's efforts to transform Russia into a major energy power and use energy as a tool of Russian foreign policy make the region all the more significant.
Moreover, China has sought to improve trade and transit ties with Central Asia over the last decade, reflecting its growing interests there. Not only is the region important for meeting China's growing energy needs, but the Chinese authorities are also concerned about separatist pressures among the Uighur population in Xinjiang and the impact of ties with Uighurs in neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Like Russia, China wants a reduction of the US military presence in Central Asia. Both powers have sought to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- a regional grouping that includes Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- to pressure the US to withdraw from the region. However, this cooperation represents a short-term marriage of convenience rather than a budding new strategic alliance. In the long run, Russia and China are likely to be rivals for power and influence in Central Asia.
Iran could also view the transitions in Central Asia as an opportunity to expand its regional influence, particularly given its close ethnic and cultural ties with Tajikistan and its long border with Turkmenistan. And Iran also has no desire to see the US fill any security vacuum that could emerge.
Pakistan and India will also watch the transitions carefully. Both have growing strategic interests in the region. Like China, India views Central Asia as an important future energy supplier. As a result, India has begun to strengthen its military ties to countries in the region, particularly Tajikistan, where it has a small base.
Finally, the transitions in Central Asia could have a strong impact on US interests. As long as the US remains involved militarily in Afghanistan, access to facilities in Central Asia will remain important. With the loss of the base at Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan, access to Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan has become the main means of re-supplying US troops in Afghanistan from Central Asia.
However, the political situation in Kyrgyzstan is far from stable. Discontent with President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's rule is rising. A leadership change or increased Russian and Chinese pressure on Kyrgyz leaders could precipitate calls for a renegotiation of the agreement regarding access to Manas.
In the 19th century, the struggle Central Asia between the Russian and British empires was called "The Great Game." Today, there are more players involved and the stakes are far higher. The US, India, Europe and Japan will face increasing tension between their short-term military needs and their long-term goal of promoting political reform in order to create more stable and reliable partners.
The key challenge will be to find the proper balance between these two objectives. Given possible leadership changes and increasing instability, meeting that challenge has never been more important.
F. Stephen Larrabee holds the corporate chair in European security at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The Chinese government on March 29 sent shock waves through the Tibetan Buddhist community by announcing the untimely death of one of its most revered spiritual figures, Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche. His sudden passing in Vietnam raised widespread suspicion and concern among his followers, who demanded an investigation. International human rights organization Human Rights Watch joined their call and urged a thorough investigation into his death, highlighting the potential involvement of the Chinese government. At just 56 years old, Rinpoche was influential not only as a spiritual leader, but also for his steadfast efforts to preserve and promote Tibetan identity and cultural
The gutting of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) by US President Donald Trump’s administration poses a serious threat to the global voice of freedom, particularly for those living under authoritarian regimes such as China. The US — hailed as the model of liberal democracy — has the moral responsibility to uphold the values it champions. In undermining these institutions, the US risks diminishing its “soft power,” a pivotal pillar of its global influence. VOA Tibetan and RFA Tibetan played an enormous role in promoting the strong image of the US in and outside Tibet. On VOA Tibetan,
Former minister of culture Lung Ying-tai (龍應台) has long wielded influence through the power of words. Her articles once served as a moral compass for a society in transition. However, as her April 1 guest article in the New York Times, “The Clock Is Ticking for Taiwan,” makes all too clear, even celebrated prose can mislead when romanticism clouds political judgement. Lung crafts a narrative that is less an analysis of Taiwan’s geopolitical reality than an exercise in wistful nostalgia. As political scientists and international relations academics, we believe it is crucial to correct the misconceptions embedded in her article,
Sung Chien-liang (宋建樑), the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) efforts to recall Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Lee Kun-cheng (李坤城), caused a national outrage and drew diplomatic condemnation on Tuesday after he arrived at the New Taipei City District Prosecutors’ Office dressed in a Nazi uniform. Sung performed a Nazi salute and carried a copy of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf as he arrived to be questioned over allegations of signature forgery in the recall petition. The KMT’s response to the incident has shown a striking lack of contrition and decency. Rather than apologizing and distancing itself from Sung’s actions,
RSS