Why has the Control Yuan been unattended for such a long time?
The Constitution says that the Control Yuan has the powers to impeach, censure or audit all government officials -- even the president and vice president.
Why would the pan-blue camp, which is attempting to depose President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), render the Control Yuan ineffective by refusing to ratify the president's nominees?
The pan-blues have the majority in the Legislative Yuan and Chen's list of nominees is required by law to consist of candidates recommended by all major parties proportion with their representation in the Legislative Yuan.
In fact, some pan-blue supporters were quite baffled by the KMT's choice to turn down Chen's list.
However, given the KMT' s much more advanced political skills, it is hardly surprising that the pan-blue camp would make such decision.
If the Control Yuan were fully staffed and functional, then the Legislative Yuan would not be able to take advantage of the Control Yuan's power and authority -- including the power to set up an internal investigation council to investigate the 2004 presidential election.
With a majority in the Legislative Yuan, this is exactly what the pan-blue camp wants.
With such power, they could continuously cause problems for the political system.
President Chen and his government may have committed some deeds that require the public's attention.
But the Control Yuan is a very important branch for checking the power of government officials and combatting corruption.
It is simply unacceptable and outrageous that politicians can manipulate the political system in this way for their own benefit.
The president has decided to submit another list of nominees for the Control Yuan.
The protests against Chen have died down. It is now time for the pan-blue camp to act honorably.
Yue-Jia Liu
Taipei
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