Tue, Jul 25, 2006 page8

• A weaker presidency may be good

  • By Bo Tedards 唐博偉
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  The group of academics who launched an appeal for President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to step down on July 15 may be lauded for attempting to fulfill a constructive role as public intellectuals. Unfortunately, their effort fell some ways short of the mark. This is especially disappointing since most of the people involved are indeed respectable academics, and some are even my personal friends.

  Tactically, they got off on the wrong foot with the clumsy manner of releasing the statement, with the text leaked to the United Daily News a couple days before their press conference. This compounded the error of not presenting it directly to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or through pro-green media or channels, so that it might have had a fighting chance to be genuinely listened to.

  More seriously, the substance of the statement was fundamentally flawed in two ways. First, the starting point -- some kind of Confucian sentiment about how the nation's leader should possess an especially high moral standard -- was simply naive. This idea leads only to cults (or anti-cults) of personality, and its persistence is one of the most serious defects of Taiwan's emerging democracy.

  More mature democracies follow a more realistic perspec-tive, most famously summarized by Lord Acton: "power corrupts." The framers of the US Constitu-tion, following their intellectual precursors in Britain, took as their premise the assumption that top leaders are more likely than not to be wicked. So they designed the entire system to limit the damage such leaders might cause through checks and balances.

  Taiwan cannot entrust its future to the vain hope of moral leadership. Taiwan has never had a truly "moral" leader, and doesn't look like it's going to get one any time soon (anyone who thinks Chinese Nationalist Party [KMT] Chairman Ma Ying-jeou [馬英九] would be a moral paragon as president is in for a rude shock).

  Where Taiwan needs more improvement is in its constitutional and legal systems to ensure that leaders do not abuse their power. In this respect, the fact that such high-ranking officials and members of the first family have been arrested or indicted (and now we can add the former vice minister of the interior), however embarrassing at present, is actually a positive step forward for Taiwan's long-term development.

  This leads to the second major flaw in the statement: a failure to address the real problems with Chen's presidency. The flurry of scandals, which are acting like Viagra on Taiwan's over-excitable media, don't rank anywhere near the top of these. Even if all the allegations prove to be correct, the scandals simply aren't big enough, and the damage to the country is not really significant. In fact, the overall scale of corruption in Taiwan is probably near an all-time low.

  Instead, progressive intellectuals ought to be focusing on much more serious issues (and they should have started quite a lot earlier, rather than waiting until Chen's popularity ratings hit rock bottom). It is actually an extensive list, although one can certainly quibble with the order or categorization.

  First, Chen apparently lacks a vision for the country's development. This flaw has become clearer in his second term, as we see nothing but repetitive, almost robotic, appeals to Taiwanese identity (note: not "ethnic mobilization" as the statement accused) replacing policy discourse.

  Second, the excessive shuffling of officials. The current premier is the fifth in six years, and only one member of the original Cabinet is still in office today. This misguided policy not only prevents anyone from getting anything done, but has also had the dire effect of driving away many talented people from government service.

  Third, vacillation in the face of obstacles. The most egregious example was with the reform of the financial units of agricultural cooperatives, back in 2002. This policy was actually supported by a majority of farmers, but when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) mobilized some farmers onto the streets, Chen backed down, pulling the rug out from under the Executive Yuan.

  Fourth, the habit of "government by campaigning," which perhaps is inherent in Chen's personality. It served him well enough through his re-election in 2004, but it is a pity that, now that he is unable to run for anything ever again, he has been unable to adjust his style. Related to that is the tendency to time the launch of vital reform initiatives for tactical electoral reasons. Exhibit A is the handling of the 18 percent preferential interest rate policy.

  Fifth, simply talking too much, which diminishes the prestige of the presidency in general and severely waters down Chen's political capital in particular. The corollary is not listening enough, since it is clear that his sources of information have become steadily narrower throughout his presidency.

  In terms of specific improvements that might result from the recent crises, this would be a good start. One way to make it happen would be for the DPP to wake up and start playing a real role in deliberating policy, rather than continuing to rubber-stamp Chen's ideas.

  Readers will notice that cross-strait relations hasn't been mentioned. That's because, contrary to what the international media would have us believe, this is perhaps the most successful area of Chen's presidency. His views on relations with China closely mirror those of mainstream public opinion, which wants to maintain independence but is unsure about the tactics, such as how strong a line to take. Here, Chen's blowing hot and cold is mostly appropriate, and the public largely doesn't blame him (the fact that hardliners on both sides of the independence-unification divide periodically lash out at him only proves the point).

  Instead, the people are frustrated that Chen hasn't been able to deliver on his domestic reform agenda. It is easy to see that each of the above issues by itself has had a more significant effect on Taiwan than corruption. Taken together, they show a picture of a disappointing presidency.

  So, should he step down? No. At least, not now.

  As mentioned above, what is most urgent is to establish well-functioning systems. There are two constitutional ways a president can be removed from office, recall and impeachment.

  The opposition had the right to launch the recall motion, but it didn't have the votes to pass. Impeachment would require some specific evidence against Chen, such as obstruction of investigations of his staff or family. If and when such evidence emerges, we should be prepared to start the impeachment process.

  Until then, Chen should stay in office. The Taiwanese people need to get used to a weaker president, one who isn't placed god-like on a pedestal. Chen fits that bill now. His serving out his term and then retiring smoothly will have positive educational value.

  In the meantime, everyone needs to work together to try to fix at least some of the real problems facing the nation, especially the need for faster and deeper reform. Here civil society, including public intellectuals, should take a leading role. Hopefully some kind of psychological barrier has been broken, and more and more people will speak out clearly.

  Bo Tedards is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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