The presidential recall campaign failed to achieve the legislative majority needed to proceed to a public referendum. Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) lawmakers cast invalid votes rather than opposing the motion, and went so far as to boycott the protest staged by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) outside the legislature during the historic vote.
The TSU preferred to attend the vote in order to make a statement -- leaving DPP heavyweights on the edge of their seats, even though the TSU did not hold enough legislative seats to change the vote's outcome. If the TSU had had enough seats to do so, would it still have chosen to abstain from voting, or would it have taken a different direction? We'll never know.
The TSU's minority status gave it little influence in this significant legislative event. This is why the TSU has allied itself with the DPP; however, it still maintains a certain distance from the DPP. If the TSU had had at least 20 seats, their votes could have changed the outcome of the recall motion. That would have altered the way President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) typically interact -- from talking "at" each other or avoiding each other like the plague, to putting their heads together and discussing certain affairs of state.
Instead, the TSU's lack of power and the sour relations between Chen and Lee left Chen little choice but to relinquish certain powers and let Premier Su Tseng-chang (
The TSU's lack of legislative influence limited its role in the recall debacle to rallying around the cause of localization. In other words, despite Chen and Lee not getting along and the TSU and DPP having their differences, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (
Speculation of a falling-out between Chen and Lee could be viewed within a larger context, involving not only the rifts that the recall motion exposed in the pan-green camp, but the potentially lethal danger the TSU poses to the DPP in the future -- something the DPP has become aware of in the wake of the aborted recall motion.
If the TSU had more seats in the legislature, they could have been the straw that broke Chen's back. In light of this, the DPP will definitely set their sights on the TSU and try to blow them out of the water in the next legislative elections.
The fact that the TSU cannot apply lethal force to the DPP is precisely why they are allied with the DPP. The a principle that seems to govern TSU-DPP relations is: either befriend your enemies or annihilate them. The TSU, however, may be regarded by the DPP as more of a political pawn than a true ally. In such circumstances, the TSU has little choice but to dance to the DPP's tune. Only by winning more legislative seats could the TSU break the DPP's leash around their necks.
Unfortunately for the TSU, the constitutional amendments pushed for by the DPP and the KMT that will result in a single-member, two vote system for the next legislative elections, disadvantage the TSU and the People First Party (PFP). In other words, the amendments will further limit the space afforded to smaller parties in the legislature to grow and develop. They will also force the smaller parties to retreat back into the fold of the larger parties' in order to stay alive.
Prior to the presidential recall vote, PFP Chairman James Soong (
This vicious competition has seen Ma and Soong throw all decency out the window, resulting in the tarnishing of Ma's image. What's more, former KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) made a mockery of the motion. And although the motion seems to have boosted Soong's political prospects, he is still likely to fall far short of winning the Taipei mayorship.
Since the presidential recall motion fizzled out, there have been reports saying that Chen and Lee are butting heads. The Chen-Lee clash is curiously like the power struggle between Ma and Soong. Obviously, Ma has learned his lesson in trying to recall Chen, and no longer supports toppling the Cabinet.
In fact, after the implementation of the single-member, two-vote legislative system, the relationship between the TSU and the DPP will surely improve. As to the relations between Chen and Lee, Lee's criticism of Chen, who has just two years left in office, was in fact aimed at the four major figures of the DPP -- Su, Lu, former premier Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) and DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun. Lee wants to encourage these four figures to announce their intentions with respect to the 2008 presidential elections. Lee seeks to hold onto his role as a "kingmaker," grooming the next commander-in-chief.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant research fellow at the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti
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