In the present state of the US-Taiwan relationship, perhaps instead of trying to focus on the attitudes of the presidents on each side -- who both seem to believe that the other is not taking his country's interests into account -- it might be useful to remember how the situation has developed, starting with the time Taiwan began moving toward democracy (and China began opening its doors to the world).
Up to around Taiwan's presidential campaign period of 1991-1992, the US had held back from making any changes in security issues and the strict rules on dealing with Taiwan that Washington had established unilaterally. In the time thereafter, the US cleared the licenses for the sale of F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, and publicly supported Taiwan's membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. An effort to review the rules was started, but internal opposition and the forthcoming change of administration ended the effort.
After the first year of the Clinton administration, the review was restarted and a few changes were made, including allowing visits to Taiwan by some US Cabinet-level officials and transits of senior Taiwanese officials in the US. These changes were offset by more substantive policies, among them the statement that the US would not support Taiwan's entry into international organizations that require statehood, or Taiwan's independence. Then followed the statement that the US supports the requirement that the assent of the Taiwanese people is needed for any change in the status quo.
In the early years of the present administration in Washington, some meaningful changes were made to broaden the range of military equipment that could be sold to Taiwan, and there was a loosening of the limits on venues and time spent in transits through the US. During this time, there has been no visit by a US Cabinet official to Taiwan.
During all three of these administrations, of course, other events have sometimes taken place that improved or restrained the relationship, such as the US encouraging China to engage in dialogue with the Taiwanese government, or efforts to strengthen Taiwan's participation in the international community. However, China has curtailed Taiwan's efforts to do so.
The extent of the changes that have taken place is reaching a point where the rules used by the US to govern its relationship with Taiwan are clearly outdated and not effective, if not counterproductive. China now has the strength to influence its relationship with the US, covering global issues important to the US. With regard to its objectives in Taiwan, China is now very openly and effectively able to counter efforts by Taiwan to maintain its present very limited involvement in international affairs and to gain more recognition in the international community.
For Taiwan, domestically and in terms of cross-strait issues, the change has had a fundamental impact. At a time when new initiatives to strengthen Taiwan's position internationally are needed, the Democratic Progressive Party has not been able to cope with an opposition that barely controls the legislature but is able to block any major objective it wants, while pursuing its own initiatives with Taiwan's adversary.
The opposition's ability to prevent the government from addressing domestic concerns has also greatly undermined the political strength of the ruling party at a time when new initiatives are needed to bolster the economy and strengthen welfare programs. Voter frustration is growing, and if this continues it will inevitably bring a change in government, but may not bring a more stable atmosphere.
The US now has priorities elsewhere, weakening its ability to focus on East-Asian matters. Whatever it wants to do about cross-strait issues, Washington has to be even more alert both to China's interests and to events in Taiwan that matter to the US. The domestic split between one side, which wants Taiwan to be a separate entity, and the other, which wants it to eventually become a part of China, has grown sharper.
The long-standing division in the US government between values and security in the Taiwan Strait has become more complex. There now are two legitimate political sides in Taiwan, each moving in a different direction and each having within it long-term objectives not desired by the US: One side focuses on democratic values and political separation, and the other on tying the economy closer to that of China and eventual unification with it.
In democracies like the US and Taiwan, continuing to insist on keeping a low profile will achieve limited results at best. It would be meaningless to maintain the status quo in managing cross-strait matters when the US, Taiwan and China all know it serves China. Continuing under the present rules for managing the relationship with Taiwan is counterproductive for all three.
The US must inevitably find the political will to become more involved, and the US and Taiwan must use a more efficient process in addressing the changing atmosphere on cross-strait issues. Both must establish frequent, broad bilateral discussions, not with single envoys from time to time. Both should enlarge their official representative offices to provide policymakers back home with more understanding of the other side.
Domestic events in China and in the US are changing continuously. In Taiwan, that is even more true, and the fundamental problem is its inability to establish an accepted identity. Washington will need to focus on the extent to which each side in Taiwan will get closer to China and thereby impact on US interests.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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