Whether or not Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (
Direct links -- Ma's promised first priority -- can only be established if Taiwan's government agrees that these links are domestic, not international, which would make it very difficult for Ma to defend Taiwan's sovereignty. And by the time Ma and Beijing finish with any mutual peace agreement -- which incidentally can only be achieved by means of Taiwan's unilateral de facto disarmament and the criminalization of the Taiwan independence movement -- the "status quo" would become utterly meaningless.
Maintaining the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait based on the "one China" policy over the next few years could eventually rank among the worst fiascos in the annals of US foreign policy.
It could serve as one of the prime lessons on how the failure to update a policy can allow a golden opportunity to pass. Most of the officials at the US State Department might even reflect fondly on President Chen Shui-bian's (
Still, nostalgia would be the kind of luxury only US officials and people outside of Taiwan can afford.
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the current debate raging in US academic circles regarding the necessity of containing Chinese military expansion in the context of US regional strategy -- with Taiwan unavoidably being drawn into the discussion.
The standard comment pro-Beijing academics provide regarding the possibility of China allowing Ma to maintain Taiwan's status as a de facto sovereign state is that Beijing would bend over backwards to accommodate Ma and therefore would be flexible with preconditions for various cross-strait dealings.
This would be in spite of the fact that, in the context of Taiwan's status, China's leadership would only be accommodating to the extent of allowing Ma to apply his infamous KMT logic to muddle the truth with the intention of pacifying the people of Taiwan.
But trusting China's leaders to behave with flexibility, which is counter to their instincts and most definitely violates their "Anti-Secession" Law regarding Taiwan's sovereignty, is a luxury the Taiwanese people can't afford either.
Perhaps what the people of Taiwan can least afford is pan-blue leaders whose constant whetting of Beijing's appetite is to a large extent responsible for the predicament Taiwan is now facing in terms of annexation pressure. This is not to mention the governmental gridlock caused by the extreme obstructionism that has been practiced by the pan-blue majority in the Legislative Yuan for six years.
But relief could arrive from an unlikely source.
Reportedly, in conjunction with "the economic development on the west shore of the Taiwan Strait in Fujian" as quoted from a speech given by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (
The project would encourage Taiwanese politicians with Fujianese ancestry to take residence in Fujian in order to engage in political activities and take advantage of opportunities for positions such as NPC representatives or even provincial deputy chief and county deputy chiefs, all to be specifically allocated to promote such activities.
This is ostensibly designed to dilute and willfully undermine Taiwan's sovereignty. A closer examination, however, would reveal that the project could hold potential merit if Beijing is willing to expand it with "fairness" in mind.
For instance, copying the "Fujian-Taiwan Special Zone" model, Beijing could set up a "Hunan-Taiwan Special Zone," "Zhejiang-Taiwan Special Zone" etc -- as many as China has provinces. Only by doing this could Beijing avoid shortchanging those "one China"-aspiring pan-blue leaders with ancestral lineage in provinces other than Fujian.
In the past, a number of pan-blue leaders wailed that the potential for development of a small island like Taiwan was simply too limited. Apparently, they were lamenting Taiwan's limited market for politicians, among other shortcomings.
If Beijing could rename part of each of China's provinces that respective province's "Taiwan Special Zone" to accommodate all those Chinese-at-heart politicians from Taiwan, the cross-strait impasse as well as Taiwan's relentless internal struggle would be halfway resolved.
Naturally, Taiwanese voters can always -- at least up to 2008 -- have the option of accomplishing this by wielding the power of their ballots instead of awaiting the improbable.
Huang Jei-hsuan
California
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