US President George W. Bush's recent visit to India is a significant development. From India's viewpoint, it confers a certain degree of legitimacy on its nu-clear status. The US has undertaken [subject to the approval of the agreement signed in New Delhi by the US Congress] to provide civilian nuclear technology for India's nuclear energy program. This had been banned following India's nuclear weapons testing in 1974 and 1998. India, though, has agreed to accept inspections of its civilian nuclear reactors by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Of its 22 reactors, eight that are involved in military related programs will not be subject to IAEA inspections. In other words, the IAEA will be allowed access to 14 civilian reactors, but that access will be subject to negotiations contingent on IAEA request. It is, therefore, a mixed picture for India.
The plus for India is that it will get access to material and technology from the US, and with its help, from other countries as well. And it will be able to do this without having to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The progress of India's nu-clear energy program had slowed because of sanctions from the US and other countries. The lifting of sanctions will enable India to diversify its energy sources from an ever growing dependence on oil from the Middle East, where production at existing fields is believed to have peaked and will soon start to decline. It is also becoming prohibitively expensive.
The minus, from the viewpoint of Indian critics of the deal, is that it might bring the IAEA into the Indian nuclear program through the back door.
The nuclear deal, in a sense, underpins a new strategic relationship between the two countries, with the US recognizing India's status as an important regional power and seeking to enmesh it into its own global strategy. It is in this context that India's potential as a counterweight to China is highlighted.
It is argued that the US regards China as a future threat to its supremacy, and is keen to contain its growing power. India, too, sees China as a security threat. According to this argument, their shared threat perception, and the need to contain China, is the basis of this newly emerging strategic equation.
And this might persuade India at some point to become part of the containment ring said to already include the US, Japan and Australia.
It is true that India and China are not the best of friends. They fought a border war in 1962, and that dispute is still not resolved. Their relationship was further complicated when the then Indian government sought to justify its nuclear testing [and hence its nuclear weapons program] in 1998 because of a perceived threat to the country's security from a nuclear-armed China.
Their relationship, though, has considerably improved in the last few years, with growing trade and expanded contacts and exchanges in all areas.
But it is also a wary relationship, lacking trust on both sides. Even though India has accepted that Tibet is part of China, Bei-jing is distrustful as India continues to play host to the Dalai Lama and his entourage as refugees.
The disputed boundary is a constant thorn, even when it is a dormant issue. China has, now and then, regarded India as an imperialist creation -- an artificial nation. That might not now be the case, but Beijing continues to regard India with suspicion of being under US influence.
India has regarded China's nuclear and conventional military aid to Pakistan as an attempt to tie down India in its neighborhood, thus circumscribing its regional role.
The insurgency in India's northeastern region was fueled by China, until then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (
China's close relationship with Burma's military regime, and reports of a Chinese naval base and other military facilities in that country, are also matters of disquiet in India.
China's opposition to India becoming a UN Security Council member is regarded as proof that Beijing will not accept India in an equivalent role.
Beijing is unhappy over the nuclear deal between the US and India as it represents a breach of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India is not a signatory, while China is one of the privileged members of the original nuclear club including the US, Russia, the UK and France.
In other words, there is underlying distrust between India and China in the midst of a good working relationship. And it doesn't look like either would like things to deteriorate. As neighbors, they have to co-exist. Beijing wouldn't like to push India further into the US' arms. Nor will India like to be a US proxy.
The emerging strategic equation between the US and India will be based on shared interests. And as long as the relationship with China remains normal and non-threatening, India is unlikely to put itself into a corner vis-a-vis China.
According to one Australian commentator, "Just by being there, being itself and being successful, India vastly complicates any potential Chinese leadership move towards an aggressive posture, should any Chinese leader be so tempted in the future."
For India, a meaningful and friendly strategic equation with the US is, as long as it is mutually beneficial, a great step forward.
The new relationship between India and the US is not just China-centered. It is bolstered by ever increasing contacts and exchanges outside officialdom.
The two countries already have significant links in the IT sector, with about a third of the computer engineers in California's Silicon Valley hailing from India. Many Indian middle class families have some connection with the US through relatives living, working or studying in the US. And India's growing economy is an important cementing factor.
According to recent polls, Indians are said to greatly admire the US. Such polls probably tend to simplify the Indian social and political landscape, where the dynamics of its politics are not easily translatable into small polls. But they are probably true where its urban middle class is concerned. The US remains the dream land for many of them.
Internationally, India is a powerful country straddling important sea lanes between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It is a useful strategic ally for the US to ensure the safety of important trade routes, especially with regard to oil supplies. And with the Middle Eastern situation becoming murkier all the time, a convergence of interests between India and the US could develop at some point to maintain peace in the area.
India is also looking east, where it is keen to forge wide-ranging relations with Southeast Asian countries. And the US would like to encourage India to play a countervailing role to China in the Asia-Pacific region.
Therefore, the emerging strategic partnership between the US and India is not a one-dimensional "China containment" development. It is much more multilayered and complex.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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