Recently, Japan's legislators passed a law to permanently allow the entry of Taiwanese tourists into Japan sans visa.
What's remarkable is that Japan is perhaps the only country in the world that's willing to do this.
At a time when most nations shun Taiwan -- and Taiwan's difficulty in retaining its limited number of diplomatic friends is growing by the day -- Japan must be seeing something most other nations, including China, aren't -- at least not yet.
Other considerations aside, such as its long-term national security imperatives, Japan might just be prescient in recognizing the eventuality of an "independent and friendly" Taiwan.
The international interests in the cross-strait issue are reflected in the US' Taiwan Relations Act, China's "Anti-Secession" Law and the US-Japan alliance. A head-on collision of these three laws or treaties would precipitate military conflict in the Strait that could eventually engulf the region and even spread globally.
China's strategic design on Taiwan is masked behind its nationalist fever, while the US and Japan equate their strategic interests with maintaining peace in the region.
It should be noted that the single dominant factor that drives the ongoing struggle in the Taiwan Strait is China's nationalism that demands the "return" of Taiwan to China. However, this particular nationalism -- which has been fired up and kept on the front burner over the years by a Beijing leadership that actually has strategic intent in mind -- could be quelled if necessary. In other words, it's a tool of the leadership and could be turned on and off as needed.
For instance, if Beijing decides that its continuing claim on Taiwan is harmful to its national security, it'll find a way to cool the fever. By peeling away the disguise and only addressing the core strategic concerns of the three relevant, big powers -- the US, China and Japan -- one can conclude that the ideal environment of minimum tension -- and hence high stability -- in the Taiwan Strait is tenable only when there exists a neutral -- in the sense of military non-alliance -- and independent state of Taiwan.
It should be stressed that only through a multilateral peace conference could this ideal cross-strait environment be established.
And, it could materialize only with the blessing of Beijing, whose claim on Taiwan is perhaps the biggest threat to world peace today. However, there is indication that Beijing might be gradually coming around to recognize that its claim on Taiwan could be taking China on the path to ruin.
The first sign came recently in the form of a calculated remark, by General Zhu Chenghu (
It looks as if Beijing is seeking a way out of its present predicament.
Nevertheless, it would take the twin catalysts of Taiwan's adequate deterrent capability and Taiwan's high degree of commitment to full-fledged independence to bring about such a peace conference and to assure a successful outcome.
Taiwan must demonstrate evidence of resolve in achieving and maintaining defense capability; not necessarily on a par with China but sufficient to deter China's aggression and therefore deflate China's internal hawkish pressure.
It's worth noting that an imbalance of military capability across the Taiwan Strait is what's feeding China's aggression, and could in turn bring on global implications. Conversely, Taiwan's adequate deterrent capability could become a cornerstone for stability in the region. Its importance can't be overstated.
Then again, Taiwan's high degree of commitment to be an independent state could prove to be the proverbial last straw that breaks the back of China's misplaced nationalism and convinces Beijing of the futility, as well as the senselessness, of trying to annex Taiwan.
This could then dovetail with Beijing's growing anxiety -- regarding the ongoing potential for military confrontation with the US -- in moving Beijing toward a multilateral peace conference.
Eventually, the strategic position of Taiwan dictates that all three countries of relevance -- the US, China and Japan -- would desire to be on friendly terms with an independent Taiwan.
Perhaps Japan and the US can see that day coming. Hopefully, so can Beijing -- and soon.
Huang Jei-hsuan
California
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