With far less knowledge of international law than Amy Chen (Letters, July 8, page 8), I still find something perplexing about the 1945-1949 period and suggest that there can be only one possible interpretation that sits with the widely known attitudes, beliefs and practices of the Allied administration in Asia.
Japanese administration was confined by the victorious Allied powers to the four main islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku as described in the surrender document, plus any other islands that the Allied command structure in Japan deemed appropriate.
From a Japanese point of view, the casualties of this policy did not just include the loss of the Taiwan colony, but also the northern Pacific islands which the US had invaded, a partitioned Korea, the Japanese part of Sakhalin Island which was forfeited and the Kurile islands.
But the basis for Japan's claim on the Kurile group is not the same as the Taiwan question: Tokyo is seeking a final peace treaty with Russia that could include discussion of the administration of the disputed islands.
Neither is it the same as the saber-rattling we see from China over Taiwan. Taiwan and the outlying islands under its control were expressly never on the list of islands authorized by the Allies to be returned to Japanese administration. Certainly there was no act of "commission" and it would require a very long bow to be drawn to say that an act of "omission" occurred. Japan never tried, for example, to sneak back into Taiwan hoping that the Allies would not act.
Therefore, from an Allied perspective, the islands must have been "empty" of sovereignty, with Japanese sovereignty extinguished, unless this sovereignty was asserted by locals or by the Allies themselves, as no one else would be able to assert that sovereignty.
The Republic of China's occupation of the island of Taiwan would therefore have to constitute an "invasion" unless the Allies had expressly given up their rights to the entire Japanese empire unilaterally, which they clearly did not do. If anything, the US military presence in the Chiang Kai-shek (
This actually leaves the US bearing some of the responsibility for the campaign of terror that occurred during that period -- a situation that has parallels in other US-dominated states.
I imagine that this interpretation would not apply to Kinmen or Matsu, being part of China's Fujian Province. But the settlement of the final status of these islands as well as that of Taiwan must be through an internationally mediated series of talks that can bring a close to outstanding issues from World War II. The term "final status" has been used in many other places, including Israel/Palestine and the Kuriles. It is a term that should give comfort to all parties.
Some people, including Chen, might regard a preoccupation with legalism as impractical and not attuned to regional needs and aspirations.
Yet these people would be the first to join a cheer squad for the Diaoyutais or any other issue that allows them to condemn Japan from the same legalistic approach.
Richard Chapman
Melbourne, Australia
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