When Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi (
Top of China's demands is a promise from Koizumi that he will stop visiting the Yasukuni shrine, which honors 14 Japanese war criminals from World War II along with the 2.5 million Japanese people who died in wars since the 1880s.
China said Wu Yi canceled her meeting with Koizumi because he refused to rule out more visits to the shrine.
Without Koizumi's promise, China is likely to continue its opposition to Japan joining the UN Security Council.
Some analysts have said China might agree to Japan joining the Security Council if new permanent members are not given the right of veto, which is enjoyed by China and the four other current permanent members. The lack of a veto right for Japan would allow China to maintain a superior status in the UN body, but it may not be enough for Beijing.
"First of all, I think Japan will not give up the veto right. But even if it does give it up, it will only be temporarily or as a step towards having the veto right," said Liu Jiangyong (劉江永), a professor at the Institute of International Studies in Beijing's Tsinghua University.
Japan and the other G4 members seeking Security Council seats -- India, Brazil and Germany -- have reportedly offered to accept a right of veto frozen for 15 years. But Liu suggested this may not satisfy China and would only lead to a "fiercer dispute" in the future.
Japan recently said that Koizumi visits Yasukuni as a "private citizen," but this seems unlikely to appease critics in China and South Korea.
"We do not accept it, and it's impossible to accept," Zha Daojiong (
"From the diplomatic aspect, it is quite clear," Zha said. Koizumi's shrine visits "mean that China and Japan do not have the exchange of [leaders'] visits."
Chinese President Hu Jintao (
But Hu is unlikely to invite Koizumi to Beijing and will almost certainly repeat his demand in April that Japan must "back up its remorse for wartime aggression with action, and deal with historical issues in a prudent and serious manner."
Both Japan and the US angered China earlier this year when they issued a US-Japan security treaty that referred to the possible defense of Taiwan. Many Chinese scholars also see Koizumi as taking a tougher diplomatic line to appease right-wing interests in Japan.
Wang Xiangsui (
"If China doesn't react, Japan will gain interests [in the East China Sea]," Wang said in a commentary in state media. "If China does react, then Japan will spread the `China threat' ... and encourage the US to intervene and profit from it."
China allowed a series of anti-Japanese protests earlier this year. But after three weekends of large-scale protests in several major cities, and some attacks on Japanese-linked businesses, the government moved to rein in the anti-Japanese sentiment. Students were lectured on the importance of "understanding the government's position" and the need to maintain good economic relations with Japan. Some universities and at least one large Chinese company threatened to expel anyone who attended unauthorized protests.
The government may have called for an end to the protests partly out of fears that protesters could later target domestic issues. But with many nationalist groups urging a boycott of Japanese goods, and Japanese public opinion increasingly turning against China, the government was probably more concerned about potential economic damage.
With protests and calls for boycotts subdued, Zha believes there will be little long-term damage to economic ties between China and Japan.
"At the market level, there is some impact, but there is no impact on the economic relations at government level. Japan cannot do without China's market, and China also cannot do without Japan's market," he said.
This has produced what many Chinese academics call "cold politics, warm economics" between China and Japan. Some foreign and Chinese scholars also point to a new "victim" ideology that has emerged in China in the last decade.
Wu Yi's public humiliation of Koizumi was probably more for the consumption of an increasingly nationalistic Chinese public than for the international community.
The Chinese Communist Party wants Japan to take the initiative, making a gesture that the party can show the public to demonstrate its growing international stature.
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