Sun Tzu, the great Chinese philosopher of war, once wrote, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." The absence of such knowledge invites trouble, often disaster. This certainly applies to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, where understanding the insurgents is both crucial and difficult.
To some degree, the Iraq insurgency reflects its historic predecessors. The conflict is "armed theater," in which the antagonists are simultaneously locked in struggle with each other and sending messages to wider audiences, particularly the Iraqi people. Like all insurgencies, public support -- or the lack of it -- will determine the outcome.
Moreover, it is likely to be a protracted performance. History suggests that once an insurgency reaches "critical mass," it takes a decade or more to eradicate it. And, like past insurgencies, the Iraq conflict is one in which the insurgents use horrific acts to intimidate the public, expose the shortcomings of the government, and goad the regime into overreactions that might turn the public against it.
But the Iraq insurgency deviates from its forebears in vital ways. Its cultural context differs from 20th-century insurgencies, particularly the use of a radical ideology derived from religion. By contrast, twentieth-century insurgencies were usually secular, based on economic class, sectarian differences, or other deep political cleavages. The intermingling of religious passion and political radicalism makes the Iraqi insurgency particularly dangerous and difficult to quell.
The strategic context of the Iraq insurgency is also new. In the twentieth century, the superpowers supported insurgency and counterinsurgency as a type of proxy conflict. The Iraq conflict, by contrast, is part of the world's first global insurgency -- the web of individual conflicts spawned by Islamist extremism, most of them related in some way to al-Qaeda, and the global war on terrorism. For the first time in history, terrorism gives insurgents the ability to strike directly at their enemies' external allies.
differences
Moreover, the organization and methods of the Iraq insurgency, while not unique, differ from those seen in the late 20th century. Multiple insurgencies co-exist in time and space, each with differing objectives and tactics.
One component is the jihadists, some of them foreign and some local, with direct ties to al-Qaeda or, at least, sympathy with its worldview. The jihadists appear to want a Taliban-style Iraq that could serve as a bastion for the wider global Islamist insurgency.
A second component consists of former Baathist officials seeking a return to power. With access to extensive funds, this group appears to sub-contract many of its operations to organized crime or "casual" insurgents motivated more by pay than by ideology.
The third component is sometimes called "Sunni nationalist," but that phrase is a misnomer, because this group's members are less concerned with Iraq as a nation than with Sunni domination of post-Hussein Iraq and responding to what they see as personal injustices or abuses. This group appears to rely heavily on tribal structures, kinship, and other local affiliations.
While successful 20th-century insurgencies developed some degree of hierarchy and a political wing, the Iraq insurgency remains a loose, amorphous network. The various components, and the subdivisions within them, do not appear to be centrally commanded. Some may cooperate; others do not.
Finally, the insurgency as a whole remains nihilistic, focused on destroying the new Iraqi government and the emerging economic and political system rather than articulating a coherent alternative. In many ways, the Iraq insurgency is analogous to urban street gangs: each component shares behavioral and organizational similarities but pursues its own aggrandizement and undertakes autonomous operations within its "turf" rather than pursuing a master plan or strategy.
three paths
The good news for those who desire stability and democracy in Iraq is that an amorphous, disorganized, and nihilistic insurgency cannot "win" in the traditional sense of replacing the government and forming a new regime. The bad news is that an amorphous, disorganized, and nihilistic insurgency can eventually evolve into a coherent, efficient, and purposeful one.
This would obviously pose a much more serious threat, but even an amorphous, disorganized, and nihilistic insurgency can survive and block stability, democratization, and prosperity for many years. To return to the analogy, urban street gangs cannot seize political power, but they can certainly keep their neighborhoods dangerous, backward, and grim.
There are, then, three paths for Iraq: evolution of a more serious insurgency, persistent violence at current levels, or resolution of the insurgency. At least three factors will determine which path that injured nation takes.
One factor is the will of the new government. Insurgent movements that succeed do so because the government's will collapses. It is not clear at this point how much determination Iraq's emerging democratic leaders will have.
A second factor is restraint on the part of the Shi'ite community. There are ominous indications that the relative forbearance of this group may end. If that happens, the insurgency will be superseded by a much more dangerous sectarian civil war.?
The third factor is the willingness of outside groups -- both states and non-state groups -- to prolong Iraq's misery by supporting the insurgency, whether overtly or by inaction. Until states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and others vigorously dry up the inflows of people and money that sustain the insurgency, Iraq will never become stable, democratic, and prosperous.
Steven Metz is Research Professor and Chairman of the Department of Regional Strategy and Planning at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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