Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (
The election was a foregone conclusion with the return of PFP Chairman James Soong (
Due to the friction between the parties, however, it cannot be denied that some PFP lawmakers had been tempted by the DPP's invitations to cooperate. As long as Soong remained overseas, the chances of convincing them to work with the DPP were much greater.
Soong would not have returned home unless he was prepared to work with the KMT -- at least for the speaker and vice speaker poll. Otherwise, he would have stayed in the US. Despite displaying a cold attitude toward Wang and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
On the other hand, it is obvious that the DPP did not put up a good fight in this election. The withdrawal of DPP Secretary-General Chang Chun-hsiung (
The DPP's decision was apparently made to help further Chen's efforts to push for reconciliation with the pan-blue camp. Any success the DPP might have had in luring KMT or PFP lawmakers would have only increased the hostility of the pan-blue camp in general, especially the KMT. That would in turn have harmed the chances of future cooperation within the legislature.
Finally, Wang's political strengths were also crucial in his re-election. He is just about the only person who enjoys widespread support from lawmakers and politicians across the political spectrum. While some pan-green members are not too happy with his continued support for KMT Chairman Lien Chan (
If Wang lost the speakership, the possibility of his succeeding the leadership of the KMT could have been jeopardized. In the long run, that would not have been good for anyone.
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