The death of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF,
At the same time, the news has triggered a wave of discussions on the issue of cross-strait relationship. Koo was a businessman, as well as a diplomat who dedicated himself to helping out with the foreign relations of the country and acting as a intermediary to the two sides of the Taiwan Striat.
He was a studious and gentle man who held a perfect grasp of the elegant arts of dealing with people. He was an exemplary model of Taiwanese gentry and Japanese nobility, as well as a refined and sophisticated businessman who was well learned in both Western and traditional cultures. The passing away of someone like him naturally invited mixed feelings from people.
However, the discussions of the cross-strait issues occassioned by Koo's death, whether on policies, personnel, or the exchanges between the two sides, seem to have been based mostly on personal emotions and subjectivism, lacking any broad perspective about the time and place in the backdrop of the events, ignoring the objective situation of the cross-strait relationship and overlooking the historical significance of the evolution of the Taiwan consciousness.
In other words, most of the discussions and commentaries on cross-strait relations made around the time of Koo's death either sang praises about the excellent negotiating skills of Koo in cross-strait talks or the historic significance of Koo's meeting with Wang Daohan (汪道涵), the chairman of China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, 海協會).
All of this commentary has missed the point, focusing on the exquisite performance of the individual actors while turning a blind eye to the era in which the events took place.
Koo had indeed done much work during his life time in the area of cross-strait relations. Due to his personality traits, he gave outstanding performances in cross-strait negotiations. In particular, as the representative of the 23 million people in Taiwan, he met and dealt with Jiang Zemin (
His performance was indeed praise worthy. It is also a rare exception that, within the political circles in Taiwan, no one from either the pro-unification or pro-independence camp ever said anything harsh about him.
Perhaps this is why some people have said that he is "irreplaceable," and that currently no one within Taiwan is comparable with Koo. Therefore, Taiwan will be further disadvantaged in future cross-strait negotiations, that cross-strait relationship can never return to the rosier days of the Koo-Wang talks, and in a nutshell the cross-strait relationship will be worse off than before, so these people observed.
Frankly speaking, we also give a thumbs up to Koo's performance. However, as often indicated by some people from the Chinese communist camp, "the objective situation can never be changed by the subjective will of the individuals."
The evolution of the cross-strait relationship follows the path of the policies of the two governments on the two sides of the Strait, the determination of the leadership, the objective circumstances in the international community, and the popular will. No one person can call the shots.
In other words, the meeting with Wang in Singapore in April of 1993, and the trip to China in 1998, they were all performances on the stage of history, and Koo left some remarkable performances behind. The reason that the cross-strait relationship is at an impasse is due to the changing times and places, rather than Taiwan's lack of top negotiators.
In other words, the Koo-Wang meeting in 1993 and Koo's 1998 trip to China had all taken place as cross-strait exchanges between the feuding Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist regimes. The other side of the Taiwan Strait has never ceased perceiving the cross-strait issue as a byproduct of the Chinese civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party. Therefore, it continues to see Taiwan as part of Chinese territory, and its stance on the "one China" principle has remained intact.
As for Taiwan, at the time of those two events, it was halfway through the "nativization" movement instigated by former president Lee Teng-hui (
That is the reason for the historic Koo-Wang talks and the subsequent disputes and controversies over whether there had ever been a consensus for "one China" under which each side is free to interpret what that "one China" is. At the time, much progress had been made in the cross-strait relationship in terms of ending the long-standing civil war and pushing for unification.
Ironically, at the time, the better that the negotiators had performed and the more productive the negotiations were, the sooner Taiwan would have been engulfed by China.
That is why, after Koo's death, the statement issued by ARATS especially praised him for "making possible the 1992 consensus during his term as the SEF chairman and standing firmly on the ground of Chinese, servicing [others], and goodwill toward [others]." Wang Daohan also indicated that the two had met twice and reached the "1992 consensus," as well as describing Koo as a man who keeps his promises.
It isn't hard to see that while China pretends to mourn Koo's death, it is using this chance to engage in unification propaganda by bringing up the issue of the "1992 consensus." In July of 1999, during an interview with German media, then-president Lee Teng-hui had announced his discourse on a "special state-to-state relationship" between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, changing the cross-strait policy which had previously been centered on "one China"(regardless of whether the so-called "one China" is the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China).
Lee had discovered a model for independent existence through his discourse based on the public international law. Thereafter, Taiwan became permanently severed from the framework of "civil war" between the Chinese Communist and the Chinese Nationalist regimes. The people of Taiwan had become an autonomous entity.
Taiwan can only engage in negotiations with the other side of the Taiwan Strait as an independent country. This historic turn of events made Wang postpone his trip to Taiwan and changed the fundamental bases of future cross-strait negotiation.
The Chinese government had thereafter repeatedly indicated that the basis for a cross-strait relationship no longer exists, suggesting that the foundation of past cross-strait negotiations had been based on the erroneous bases of future unification and ending the civil war.
Therefore, it isn't important whether Taiwan has top negotiators such as Koo at this time. The most important thing Taiwan must keep intact is its Taiwan consciousness and independent sovereignty in negotiating with the other side, so as to ensure co-prosperity of the two sides.
The 1993 Koo-Wang talks and the 1998 trip to China were the peak of Koo's career.
However, such past cross-strait negotiations -- based on future unification and as an extension of the Chinese civil war -- are akin to the last supper that Jesus had with his disciples, right before the betrayal by Judas.
Unfortunately, the "special state-to-state" discourse in 1999 and the change of ruling party in 2000 has saved Taiwan from the death trap of unification.
The myth of the 1992 consensus has been broken. In the future, Taiwan should insist on cross-strait negotiations based on comity, mutual interests, equal sovereignty status and peaceful co-existence.
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