Predicting election results in Taiwan can be embarrassing for politicians and pundits alike. In March, the polls predicted that President Chen Shui-bian (
Last week, all signs pointed to a victory by Chen's pan-green coalition -- Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) plus former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) even more independence-oriented Taiwan Solidarity Union -- in the Legislative Yuan elections. But this time it was the pan-blue's turn to squeak through: the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)/People First Party coalition won 114 seats in the 225-seat legislature; its first victory in the past four major elections.
Parties rarely lose (or win) elections based on a single issue or factor, but it seems clear that Chen's brand of "in your face" politics, which in the past successfully fueled nationalistic sentiments (and votes) backfired this time. While claiming to still honor his pledge not to formally change the Republic of China's (ROC's) name -- a de facto declaration of independence and deliberate crossing of China's presumed red line -- he has continued to push this envelope, by "informally" substituting Taiwan for the ROC every chance he gets. He even pledged that next year's Quixotic quest to join the UN would be under the name Taiwan.
Swing voters reportedly saw his recent directive that "Taiwan" would henceforth be used instead of "China" in the title of state-owned firms as unnecessarily antagonistic; many feared serious economic and political repercussions from Beijing. Meanwhile, Chen's pledge to change the name of Taiwan's overseas missions caught Washington by surprise, causing another public rebuke condemning this "unilateral change in the status quo" (thereby offering the Bush administration a rare opportunity to call someone else a unilateralist).
But, will Chen see the election as a warning to scale back his confrontational approach? If he chooses not to, the results are pretty easy to predict: an increase in cross-strait tensions, a continued deterioration in Taipei's relations with Washington and continued political deadlock at home.
What's harder to predict are the consequences if Chen decides that a kinder, gentler approach is in order. Will Beijing accept the olive branches or dismiss them as "insincere" (its favorite retort)? Will Washington let bygones be bygones? And will the pan-blues decide to put the interests of Taiwan ahead of their own desire to get even? There is little cause for optimism in all three instances.
The new leadership in Beijing has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and creativity in its approach to many other issues, but seems locked into its previously unsuccessful "just say no" policy regarding any overture coming from Chen. The election setback opens a window of opportunity to move forward, now that Beijing can rest somewhat easier that no major constitutional change is likely during the remainder of Chen's term. But whether or not Chinese President Hu Jintao (
While it remains easy to find staunch Taiwan supporters in Washington, US President George W. Bush seems increasingly fed up with Chen's antics. Witness his public rebuke last December during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) visit and the most recent pointed criticism against Chen's name-change initiatives. (Taipei's assertion that it was merely trying to "avoid creating confusion in the international community" insults the intelligence of even its most ardent supporters.)
The Bush administration came to power convinced that, in cross-strait matters, Beijing was the main problem. As its second term begins, this is no longer the case; positive steps, not lame excuses, will be required to restore Washington's confidence.
One would hope that the pan-blue and pan-green leaders would see the upcoming three-year break in major elections as an opportunity to develop a more cooperative approach to governing, but I wouldn't bet on it. The impending vote on the US$18 billion arms package will be a test case; will the pan-blues put national security first and support an arms package that it would have no doubt pursued had it been in power? Just as the DPP has found it difficult to make the transition from being in the opposition to actually governing, the KMT, after 50 years in power, still hasn't figured out how to act as a responsible opposition.
In all three instances, it will be up to Chen to make the first move, by extending olive branches in multiple directions. Those who feared that a DPP election victory would result in a further deterioration in cross-strait and trans-Pacific relations and/or the demise of the KMT are no doubt breathing easier. But those of us hopeful that the election results will open the door for improved cross-strait relations, renewed trust between Taipei and Washington and more cooperative, predictable politics in Taiwan remain to be convinced.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal [www.csis.org/pacfor].
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