Many Taiwan watchers here in Washington, having miscalculated on the last election in March, are now more humble in guessing the results of the legislative elections. The majority of those who are willing to do so lean toward a modest majority by the pan-green camp.
There is, however, concern by many observers that the present administration in Taiwan might see this as a mandate to act on issues that are of great importance to many of the leaders in the ruling party, but would inevitably raise tensions with China to a very high level.
I do not believe this will be the case. Whatever issues are pursued, China will inevitably voice its ire and press the international community to make clear their concern to the US and Taiwan. They will have little basis for doing so, however, as the Taiwanese leadership, domestic difficulties notwithstanding, will pursue its national interest, ie, strengthen its relations with America, make efforts at beginning a dialogue with China and reform its institutions to meet today's challenges.
What generates concern and doubt about the direction President Chen Shui-bian's (
One has to begin with the possible reaction from China. On the one hand it is strengthening its influence throughout the world, and on the other it has more constraints in how to deal with Taiwan. The issue is not just a legal matter, or even just a political one, but it deals with China's own self-imposed national dignity as well. Thus, reaction is more uncertain, while its consequences go far beyond simply a cross-strait matter.
Other concerns are based on Taiwan's domestic situation. The experience of the recent presidential election campaign continues to linger in the minds of Washington officials and academics. In retrospect, one could have expected that Taiwan's democratic presidential election campaigns would inevitably come to include controversial issues relevant to the cross-strait relationship.
The experience can also be seen as a useful warning for both the US and Taiwan, indicating that a continuous dialogue between the two is vital. The current campaign for legislative seats has shown that communications has improved, but it is also beginning to show that foreign involvement in internal affairs of another country, no matter how close and friendly it might be, needs to be dealt with prudently, by both sides.
So must the understanding of the countries that are Taiwan's friends. The tensions that have developed not just this past year or two, but well into the last decade as Taiwan's democratization has developed, are in large measure a result of that democratization. In the people's democracy that exists in Taiwan, political leaders cannot be expected to "maintain a low profile" to appease adversaries on matters so vital to the electorate. For the elected leader of Taiwan, that would be political suicide. That does not mean he or she does not need to be prudent, but does mean its people must be informed.
Another reason for concern for Taiwan's immediate future is the ruling party's fundamental objectives for gaining independence, and the risks this involves if carried out.
The concern is not based only on campaign rhetoric, but also on the generation now in power, many of whom lived and made sacrifices under a regime that insisted Taiwan must be a part of China (though not under Beijing's present system).
Another concern is that a ruling party with both control of the Executive Yuan and a majority in the Legislative Yuan might create instability.
In China, it is quite understandable that it opposes anything that in any way strengthens Taiwan's ability to govern itself. In Taiwan, it is quite understandable that the opposition will criticize anything that will strengthen the ruling party's ability to govern well. But why might there be opposition coming from the US?
Over the years after 1979, there was an implicit understanding that Taiwan would conduct its external affairs in a low-key manner.
That became unsustainable with the transformation of its political system to a democracy. The absence of any meaningful way to overcome this development has inevitably led to fundamental but sensitive issues being debated publicly in election campaigns in Taiwan.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has a platform that explicitly advocates independence with no mention of how this could be accomplished peacefully. Coming to a complete consensus domestically on what these objectives are, and how best to pursue them, is still being debated.
Given America's commitments and interests in this matter, inevitably this causes concern. It is in the interest of both the US and Taiwan that mutual trust be fully regained, and a better understanding of where each side's objectives hope to go.
As is the case in democratic Taiwan, in America there are many voices heard on almost any subject. What is heard most in the media are the think tank experts and academics, the majority of whom are wary of a DPP-led government and legislature.
Government voices on the subject come primarily from the US State Department, the US Defense Department, and the National Security Council (White House). Each has a somewhat different view, but publicly hold to administration positions and tend to accept the commitments made by Taiwan.
My reason for believing that Chen would not lead the country toward high tension in the Taiwan Strait if his party controls both branches of government is that it would undermine Taiwan's fundamental national interests of improving the relationship with the US; continuing efforts to begin a dialogue with China; and pursuing the reform of Taiwan's governmental institutions.
In addition, the politics of Taiwan will assure that domestic reforms will be debated openly, probably very noisily, but held within the parameters established by Chen. There will also be restraints put on the DPP by the number of seats it will control.
It has only 95 candidates running in the election. Even adding the at-large members that will result from the percentage of seats gained by the election, and the seats of the TSU, which will not always agree with the DPP, especially on the issues of sovereignty, the 75 percent votes required to pass any change of the Constitution will be difficult to attain even on non-sovereignty issues.
No highly significant and sensitive issue is foolproof for any administration in a democracy, but the atmosphere described above makes a strong case: The status quo sought by most of Taiwan's people and Taiwan's friends abroad will be maintained.
Nat Bellocchi is former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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