During his meeting with chairwoman and CEO of Hewlett-Packard Carly Fiorina on Oct. 15, President Chen Shui-bian (
Actually, Chen was just making general remarks when receiving foreign guests. It was enough that Fiorina made a refusal to Chen's face; there was no need to embarrass Taiwan and blow the issue out of proportion in a written statement. Her straightforward refusal, however, shows that other than Washington, which is still willing to intervene in cross-strait affairs for its own interests, Taiwan does not have many friends in the international community. It is impractical to seek help from others unless we can regain mutual trust in the cross-strait relationship, cultivate a climate favorable for cross-strait talks, and change our negotiation stance and strategies.
Responding to Chen's National Day address, Zhang Mingqing (
From the perspective of negotiation strategies, however, both Taipei and Beijing are actually reserving room for the resumption of dialogue in the future. It just takes time, patience and a favorable atmosphere before it can materialize. Many people think that only Chen made a concession, when he suggested using the 1992 Hong Kong meeting as the basis for cross-strait talks. Yet didn't Zhang also offer a carrot, even though the stick predominated in his speech?
The stick in Zhang's speech was Beijing's dissatisfaction about Chen's ploy with the national title issue. His remarks were also harsh when he responded to Chen's statement that the Chinese military force is the cause of "shadows of terror" and "forces of darkness" across the Taiwan Strait. Over the past two years, Beijing has said many times that direct link talks should not involve the "one China" issue. But in a statement given on May 17, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said that "one China" should be the premise of direct link talks. In its response to Chen's Double Ten National Day address, however, the office said in a written statement that "if the Taiwan authorities acknowledge the `1992 Consensus,' cross-strait dialogue and talks could be resumed immediately." This showed that Beijing not only flip-flopped in its stance in the May 17 announcement that "one China" must be the premise of direct link talks, but has also made a written statement to this effect.
Chen proposed the use of the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong for negotiations. The most important basis used at that time was to put aside political conflicts and to talk about practical issues. On the surface, mentioning the individual interpretations of the "one China" principle by Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (海基會) and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (海協會) in 1992, Zhang seemed to go against the Chen administration, as the latter has wanted to avoid the issue of "one China." Zhang, however, also mentioned that two sides should put aside political conflicts based on the "one China" principle in order to resume cross-strait talks and negotiations as soon as possible. Therefore, there is still plenty of room for negotiation, depending on how the US mediates and how Taipei and Beijing make concessions.
Since coming to power, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has never been willing to accept Beijing's "one China" principle, not even the 1992 consensus that contains the principle, and tried hard to deny and demonize the 1992 consensus. After the presidential inauguration in May, the international climate prevented Taiwan from seeking independence and encouraged cross-strait talks, imposing an increasing pressure on Taipei. In order not to offend any party, Chen had no other choice but to express his goodwill by proposing to use the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong for negotiations on Double Ten National Day.
Either in the past or at present, either during the DPP or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) rule, Taipei is unlikely to accept Beijing's "one China" principle. At the same time, Beijing is unlikely to accept the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong as the basis for re-starting cross-strait talks as Taipei has wished. Beijing's latest stance is that it wants to talk yet it is also ready to attack and not afraid of postponing the talks. Taipei is faced with pressure from Washington to renew talks. Under such circumstances, a new round of talks is possible only when both sides make concessions under the mediation of the US. Beijing has to go back to the 1992 consensus, but Taipei also must go back to the 1992 consensus, which it has tried to deny over the past four years.
Finally, before official talks are resumed, both sides need to take several steps. First, Beijing and Taipei need to rebuild trust in each other. Second, they need to cultivate an atmosphere good for resumption of talks. Third, leaders on both sides have to refrain themselves and their subsidiaries from making remarks that only make the relationship more tense.
Edward Chen is a professor of the Graduate Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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