The Chinese Communist Party's third generation leader Jiang Zemin (
Does this mean that Hu's time has arrived? It is still too early to say.
Hu's rise has been shrouded in mystery. When he took over the presidency and the position as party leader, international media could not pin down his political beliefs. Even though he had already wielded considerable power, he was careful not to impinge on Jiang's power. He did not pronounce his policies, probably because he was prudent. What he did was a likely necessary political calculation during a leadership change in an authoritarian regime.
With Hu's replacement of Jiang, will there be a policy change? In the short term, Hu is unlikely to modify Jiang's policies too much. Beijing will continue to stay on good terms with the US. Not challenging Washington, it will however embrace policies that increase its presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. Though Hu's proposal of "peaceful rising" for China was shot down by hawks like Jiang, the country's continued economic development will inevitably force Hu to downplay the intimidating force China represents. Hu's use of strategies is expected to be more flexible since he now does not need to worry as much about pressure from hawks in the military.
Jiang has held power for over a decade and has been a dominant influence on cross-strait relations. "Jiang's eight points" are on a par with Deng Xiaoping's (
In the two years that Hu has been in power, he has focused primarily on battling corruption and building up the economy. While Hu will, in the short term, assess the results of the US presidential election and Taiwan's legislative election, he will certainly not depart from Jiang's Eight Points. This does not rule out a more active posture in developing cross-strait trade as a means of using commercial pressure to bring about unification. This is something that Taiwan needs to guard against.
In his videoconference with the UN Correspondents Association last week, Chen sought to engage Hu in a dialogue. Taiwan recognizes that Hu is now established in power, but any thaw in the cross-strait relationship will probably have to wait till spring next year.
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