On Monday, the Cabinet announced that it was considering making Chinese Television System (CTS) a public broadcaster, possibly to be followed by integrating it with the Public Television Service (PTS), Hakka TV, Mac TV and the proposed Aboriginal TV in order to form a "public media group." These suggestions triggered much discussion in media circles. As for making Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) part of the public broadcasting network, an idea that was also in the Cabinet proposal, a final decision will not be made until the results of CTS' transformation are clear.
Putting aside the pros and cons of creating a public media group, the Cabinet should abide by the basic rules of a democratic country and insist that the government not interfere with media operations. In the creation of this public media group, the government must ensure that ownership and management are separate to prevent any suspicion of government interference.
For instance, at the two televised policy debates broadcast on PTS during this year's presidential election, it was reported that questions to the candidates had to be submitted beforehand. This shows that the PTS is subject to political pressure and lacks either the ability or the courage to counter it. As a result, the debates were little more than exhibition matches. This illustrates why the legislature must provide policy measures to prevent political intervention in public media.
Many readers know that the Ministry of National Defense holds shares in CTS and that the former Taiwan Provincial Government used to fund and manage TTV. China Television (CTV) received financial backing from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). During the martial law era, the three government linked (and consequently government controlled) TV stations monopolized television broadcasting. After martial law was lifted, the three stations failed to compete with cable TV stations run by private enterprises, and in less than 20 years these three stations faced financial crises. Both CTS and TTV rely on government funding for their survival while the CTV has the KMT to settle its accounts.
We can understand why the government is pressing for inclusion of the Aboriginal and Hakka television stations in a public media group to resolve potential financial difficulties. Yet what is the difference between doing this and nationalizing these stations? If the government wants to incorporate CTS, TTV and Mac TV into a public television group, these operations will face the restrictions that apply to non-profit organizations. How would the government deal with the massive financial losses that might ensue from this? We hope that before it makes a decision the government releases complete financial details of this plan so that massive expenses to taxpayers can be avoided.
The Government Information Office cannot simply say that because the government owns a large share of CTS it won't cost much to incorporate it into a public media group. The issue is that the government-owned share of the company represents the taxpayers' investment, and a merger with other stations may simply be the beginning of new problems. Because so much remains uncertain, we hope that the government's decision-making on this issue is transparent, so that taxpayers will be aware of the possible costs that they will have to pay.
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