During visits to various schools and colleges in China, I am frequently asked: "Journalism and communications are a combined discipline in other countries. Why are they separate in China today?" The answer is simple: different traditions and cultural backgrounds.
Journalism and communications are products of the US education system. Between them, there exists a general conflict between theory and practice. But there is no substantive difference in their philosophical foundations. Both have as their objectives the enrichment of US capitalism and its free, democratic system.
During World War I and World War II, sociologists from the University of Chicago inherited the legacy of the early 19th century "progressive movement." Taking John Dewey's pragmatism as their guideline, they explored the media's pedagogical role in social transition (urbanization, industrialization and large-scale immigration from Europe). They promoted gentle, gradual social reforms.
At the end of World War II, with US power at its height, communications studies reigned supreme at Columbia University. Focusing on the processes and functions of the media, the discipline tended to become conservative and narrow. In the late 1970s, it was challenged by western European Marxism.
Peking University was the cradle of China's journalism education, where people such as Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培) raised their banners high. Taking the US as their mentor, they burned with the spirit of liberalism and viewed journalism as part of China's modernization. After 1949, the legitimacy of journalism theory changed along with the political power. Following Lenin's doctrine, a priori privileges were given to "the party's mouthpiece" so that it could, by subterfuge, represent the voice of the proletariat .
Apart from this, no other voice was allowed. After the agony of the Cultural Revolution, China opened up out of curiosity, longing to learn from Western scholarship. But no sooner were communications studies introduced from the US and Britain than the "ideological czars" [people such as Hu Qiaomu (胡喬木) and Deng Liqun (鄧力群)] -- who had always harbored hatred in their hearts -- criticized the "capitalist class" stigma of communications studies, saying that it blurred the direction of class struggle.
China's education system is controlled by the central government. When the education ministry reviews and approves "doctorate points," it makes a clear distinction between journalism and communications studies.
So, there are two points to make. One, in journalism theory, the authorities resolve academic debate by political means in order to safeguard the fundamental doctrine of the "party's mouthpiece." There's no knowing how many people have been purged. Every word the party says is the truth and therefore no debate is allowed. Apart from offering tenuous arguments, the authorities have no other recourse than suppression.
In apparent seriousness, theorists debated for several decades over the "mouthpiece theory" and "information theory" of journalism -- with new scholars replacing those who have fallen, fighting life-and-death struggles and attacking each other's weak spots. The history of journalism became a little more lively, especially in the collection of historical data. However, the historical view followed the direction set by the party and offered few new ideas.
Two, in the area of communications studies, such as "the early stage of socialist market eco-nomy," Western scholarship has been introduced with a one-sided view at best. It is a matter of poor imitation.
Scholarship in journalism and communications theory has been unable to keep up with changes in real-life practice. But China has begun to produce doctorates in journalism and communications studies. Chinese people care more about face than substance; they stress "doing it big, doing it strong" in everything.
To put it bluntly, the big eat the small. Media units are forcibly merged to become conglomerates, but in fact, this is nothing more than syndicated monopolization. A merger of entirely unrelated schools results in a hodge-podge crowd. But you can't make an aircraft carrier by tying sampans together.
All this is driven by the will of officials and executive orders, not by free will. China may find it difficult to become the world's No. 1 in other areas, but it has good prospects in the production of doctoral students.
Undertaking doctoral studies requires academic curiosity, enthusiasm and discipline. Only then can one cultivate taste and excel. Only a mentor-intern system can inculcate influence by way of experience. Doctorates should not be created in a mass-production process like an assembly line in a Ford auto plant.
A certain school in Beijing has scored victory by numbers, recruiting a breathtaking 150 doctoral students per year. One professor took in 30 doctoral students in one swoop. Even if that person has three heads and six arms, meeting each student for one hour a week leaves that person no time to do anything else.
Above professors there are "doctoral supervisors." Doctoral supervisors who have no doctorates scramble to take up doctoral studies. This is called "doctoral supervisors gunning for doctorates." This has got to be a Guinness world record with Chinese characteristics.
Lee Chin-chuan is head of the English and communications department at the City University of Hong Kong.
Translated by Francis Huang
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