A seminar called "Financial policies and economic development under the rule of Chiang Ching-kuo (
This is just the way people are -- and while not difficult to understand -- it allows those past their prime to reminisce about past victories and defeats, and to brag and defend themselves. However, some opinions differed from what mine as an old financial journalist. I would here like to put forward some of my thoughts.
When Chiang was in power from 1972 to 1988, Taiwan went through two energy crises and an economic transformation. Many praiseworthy things occurred during this period in the areas of economic growth, employment and income distribution. In a discussion of Chiang's work, it would be a matter of opinion whether we claimed 60 percent achievements and 40 percent mistakes, or 70 percent achievements and 30 percent mistakes, but to one-sidedly cover up his errors and praise his virtues, painting him all in glowing colors, is not a very realistic way of portraying the truth.
Some participants in the seminar wanted the government to learn from the spirit of Chiang's well-known 10 Key Infrastructure Projects. However, while these infrastructure projects included some successful examples of good governance, such as the freeways and the Taoyuan Airport, there is no lack of examples of inappropriate or failed investments, such as shipyards and the Suao and Taichung ports.
Some participants used these projects as a platform from which to launch severe criticism at the government. They said Chiang was careful with his money, that he didn't issue debt, had flawless judgement, and that the projects definitely were not a matter of simple slogans. There is no harm in examining the truth of such pompous claims by comparing them to the memories of Li Kuo-ting (
Chiang's fondness for grandiose and impressive undertakings can also be seen in the announcement of the 12 National Development Projects in 1977. Li pointed out that the 12 development projects mostly were a list of items that had never been substantively researched, and that didn't have completion dates. Following the same pattern as the 10 infrastructure projects, it wasn't known how they would be financed at the time of the announcement. With investment in public construction projects being so vague, Li stressed that many big construction investments at the time were castles in the air.
Other participants praised Chiang for respecting financial expertise and demanded that "the government should learn" from his example. Indeed, Chiang was often tolerant and generous and delegated responsibilities, but certainly not always.
In his oral history, Li said that in contrast to Chiang Kai-shek (
Others were nostalgic for Chiang's rule, saying that he persisted in separating government and industry and eliminating black gold. This claim doesn't stand up to scrutiny, either. In the spring of 1985, also during the Chiang era, the Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal led to a financial crisis.
At the time, Yu Ching-tang (余井塘), who held many important posts within the KMT, was managing director of Chiao Tung Bank. Yu, who rarely spoke out, sharply denounced the Tenth Credit Cooperative at a board meeting. Claiming that the case involved NT$10 billion in lost funds, he said, full of agitation, "NT$10 billion, have you ever before heard of a corruption case involving NT$10 billion?" When he finished, he suffered a stroke and died on the spot.
The Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal did not happen with Lee Teng-hui (
Yet others called the Taiwanese economic performance prior to the mid-1980s miraculous, and praised Chiang by saying that he had made the greatest contribution. However, according to the late Academia Sinica academic Hsing Mu-huan (
With the pressures of liberalization and internationalization, the man in power both lacked ways of actively solving these issues and was unreceptive to suggestions. This led to the economic hardship following the money games and the burst economic bubble. This caused Sun Yun-suan (
Furthermore, one person presented a report at the seminar, in which he pointed out that Chiang "repeatedly relaxed the investment promotion measures ... creating an economic miracle."
Fifteen years ago, however, the same author argued that the investment-promotion rules "did not do much to help economic growth. Instead, they created economic and social inequalities." At the time, the same elderly gentleman also stressed that "the importance of economic development diminished as government leaders over time changed their views of the importance of economic development." Today, however, he has changed his tune and praises Chiang for being "steady, strong and solemn" in creating an economic miracle.
At the time, Chiang Nan (江南), the author of A Biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, found it revolting that the late general Wang Sheng (王昇) intended to promote Chiang Ching-kuo for succession (as president) and wrote an article criticizing Wang for his deification of Chiang. Today, Chiang has already been dead for 15 years, and there is nothing wrong with a reevaluation of his achievements and mistakes, but turning one's back on reality and painting him in glowing colors, however, leads to suspicions of new attempts at deification. This is what happened, and one cannot help sighing out of concern for Taiwan's democracy.
Lu Shih-xiang is chief executive officer of the Foundation for the Advancement of Media Excellence and serves as a member of the Taipei Society.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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