China and Japan recently marked the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. On Aug. 12, 1978, the two governments signed the historical treaty in Beijing, marking the end of hostilities. The two countries pledged to not wage war against each other and to build a neighborly and friendly
relationship.
Anniversaries are important occasions for celebration, remembrance and for re-energizing efforts toward a better future. As Beijing and Tokyo mark the 25th anniversary of their treaty, the two Asian giants have to develop a mature relationship that would be the anchor of future Asian-Pacific peace and stability. Behind the celebratory (although much toned down) festivities linger the shadow of the past, mutual suspicions, distrust of each other's intentions and unresolved territorial disputes.
Over the last 25 years, China and Japan have developed extensive ties in the areas of trade, investment and cultural exchange. The two-way trade passed US$100 billion last year, making Japan China's No. 1 trade partner. Japanese investment in China is well over US$25 billion, with major Japanese automakers and electronic giants relocating their manufacturing to China. Japan's development assistance has amounted to US$15 billion and has made significant contribution to Chinese economic development over the last three decades. Over 200 Chinese and Japanese cities are paired as sister cities and two-way people-to-people exchanges exceed 3 million per year.
Despite this ever growing economic interdependence, the political relationship between the two countries has yet to be fully developed. Three issues in particular could strain the relationship if not well managed: historical baggage, threat perceptions and territorial disputes.
These developments are taking place at a time when both countries are experiencing a generational change in leadership against the dynamics of changing domestic politics and the external environments.
The two countries remain haunted by the past. The Japanese textbook issue continues to rile China. The annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians, including Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Cabinet members further anger Beijing. While Beijing admonishes Tokyo to face up to its historical past, the new generation of Japanese politicians, and the public at large, are becoming increasingly impatient with the politics of apologies. The recent incident involving several dozen Chinese workers exposed to the leakage of abandoned chemical weapons left by the invading Japanese army in Qiqihar in Heilongjiang Province keeps the memory of Japan's wartime atrocities fresh.
Beijing and Tokyo are suspicious of each other's intentions. Japan is wary of China's growing military and economic power; in particular the latter's increasing defense budgets and its nuclear and strategic missile modernization. A recent US Department of Defense annual report on China's military power suggests that some of the Chinese short-range missiles are targeted at US forces in Okinawa Prefecture.
China, on the other hand, is highly suspicious of Japan's role in the future of East Asia's security structure and its pursuit of "normal" nation status. Beijing is closely monitoring the expanded role of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the US, including the dispatch of JSDF personnel overseas. Chinese commentators suggest that Tokyo is using this and the North Korean nuclear crisis as pretexts to not only become a "normal" country but also to embark on a path of remilitarization.
China and Japan have yet to resolve their territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Tokyo reacts strongly to what it considers as serious intrusions of its territorial waters by Chinese maritime survey ships. Beijing is angered by the Japanese government's acquiescence in allowing right-wing groups (and some politicians) to conduct provocative activities.
To develop a mature, stable relationship, China and Japan not only need to sustain and deepen dialogue on security to hedge against potential misunderstandings that can arise because of divergent national interests, objectives and security policies, but more importantly, they have to take specific steps to consolidate existing arrangements and create conditions for moving forward. China and Japan have closely consulted one another over the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The development of a multilateral regional security architecture could also mitigate mutual suspicions.
Sino-Japanese relations need constant nurturing and this should be high on the policy agendas in both countries. In this context, Beijing and Tokyo need to do a much better job at fostering greater exchanges between their younger generations to enhance mutual understanding. Previous Chinese and Japanese statesmen such as Zhou Enlai (
The two countries' media bear special responsibility and should also play a critical role in fostering a stable bilateral relationship. More needs to be said and publicized about the efforts to promote Sino-Japanese relations at both the non-governmental and governmental level. Negative reporting could only feed into the frenzy of the nationalist and extremist elements and will do more harm to long-term bilateral ties.
These are no easy tasks and indeed the challenges are enormous. But China and Japan must try because the stakes are too high for them, and for the region as well.
The 1970s and 1980s have been characterized by analysts as the golden age of Sino-Japanese relations. The 25th anniversary of the friendship treaty should be an occasion to chart a new course in bilateral relations.
Yuan Jing-dong is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and teaches Chinese politics and Northeast Asian security and arms control issues at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
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