In a recent US State Department press conference, the depart-ment's spokesman said that "supporting Taiwan's bid to join the World Health Assembly [WHA] as an observer is a consistent policy of the US government rather than a policy made under the pressure from Congress."
A little over two weeks before, US President George W. Bush signed the law establishing this policy. The law also included a requirement that the executive branch must report to the Congress within a specified time just how the law is being implemented. The president, in his signing statement, pointedly included a reminder that it is "consistent with the president's constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the executive, or the performance of the executive's constitutional duties."
For the casual reader, it may be seen as just a turf problem, and is usually buried by the media in the success of gaining a sought-after agreement -- such as US support in the World Health Organization (WHO) issue. In fact, the tension between the two branches of government on this matter is caused by the wording, or lack of it, in the US Constitution, and on occasion has rather important consequences -- such as the substance contained in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), for example.
There are doubtless many instances in US history where this fundamental disagreement between Congress and the executive branch on this issue has been fought out. For the Taiwan-US relationship, however, it was relevant beginning in the post-World War II period. Congress then had a strong "Free China Lobby" which may have been important in helping to oppose the spread of communism, but conveniently ignored the "free" part of it that was not taking place on Taiwan.
The executive branch, with time, became more supportive of establishing a relationship with the PRC, though there were many that felt it was necessary to take into account the demographic differences in Taiwan. The State Depart-ment, for example, in the Shanghai Communique of 1972, insisted on using "all Chinese" (on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain Taiwan is a part of China) rather than the original "all people." By then, the old Free China Lobby in Congress had weakened, but was still strong enough to demand that the Congress be notified before any change took place in the US relationship with Taiwan.
In 1979, the executive branch under former US president Jimmy Carter did not do so (on the same grounds Bush referred to just recently on the WHO issue). The result was that the TRA became the foundation for the present relationship with Taipei.
Since then, there have been differences between the two branches on the subject of Taiwan, but they were not necessarily based only on the relative authority the two branches should have over foreign affairs. The interpretations (usually called the "six assurances") of the 1982 Communique, for example, had support in both branches. So did the approval for transferring the needed techno-logy for the Indigenous Defense Fighter, though unfortunately there was not very much enthusiasm for it in some elements on the Taiwan side as well.
During former US president George Bush's administration, two important events in Taiwan-US relations were the support for Taiwan's entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the precursor to the WTO) and the approval to license the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. While there were differences between the two branches, especially on the F-16s, they were not as intense as before or as intense as they would become again.
During former US president Bill Clinton's administration, the struggle between the two branches over Taiwan matters returned. The executive branch, anxious to improve relations with China, was reluctant to loosen rules governing the Taiwan-US relationship that were becoming less appropriate for a democratic Taiwan. The Congress was aware the White House was reviewing its policy on Taiwan and had been promised a briefing when the review was completed. During that time, a request for a transit through Honolulu by former president Lee Teng-hui (
Inevitably, this behavior generated a request, encouraged by many in Congress and around the country, to permit Lee to visit his alma mater. The executive branch refused. Major newspapers around the country condemned the decision. The Congress almost unanimously demanded a reversal of the decision and threatened to pass a law to that effect. The US president had been placed in an untenable position -- damned if he did and damned if he didn't.
Much to the embarrassment of the executive team (who had promised the Chinese the visit would not take place), the president reversed his decision rather than face a veto-proof law forcing him to do so. Congress had once again, as in the passing of the TRA, demonstrated its voice could be heard in matters dealing with foreign affairs.
With the peaceful transfer of power in Taiwan in 2000, followed by a new administration in Washington more sympathetic to Taipei, the need to adjust the rules of the relationship, finally, but gradually, was being addressed. Prior to this, as Taiwan's democracy rapidly took shape, the needed adjustments had not kept pace. The Taiwan Policy Review, begun in the administration of former president Bush but completed by its successor, was shaped more to address Beijng's sensitivities than to meet the needs of the Taiwan-US relationship.
Both to strengthen America's capability to meet its security commitments, and to better demonstrate support for a fellow democracy, gradual adjustments in conducting the relationship continues to be made. But the tensions between the executive and legislative branches on foreign policy will continue, and at times, such as the recent comments by Bush on signing the law on support for Taiwan in the WHO demonstrate, will continue to be a sensitive element of the Taiwan-US relationship.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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