In a news briefing following US President George W. Bush's meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) on June 1 on the sidelines of the G8 summit, a US government official told reporters that the main topics discussed by the two leaders were North Korea, the SARS epidemic, the war on terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Journalists then asked 33 questions, not one of them concerning Taiwan. The official delivering the briefing finally asked, "Does no one have any questions about Taiwan? Are you all asleep?"
Someone then asked "What about Taiwan?"
Bush administration officials themselves say they "forgot to include Taiwan in the opening remarks, without anyone realizing it. US officials are meticulous when delivering a briefing, and there will be no forgetting. The purpose of not including Taiwan in the opening statement was to highlight the fact that Taiwan was not a main topic and that only if someone poses a question will there be an answer.
But American journalists don't think Taiwan is newsworthy, to the point where not one question was asked. The US did not want China to issue its own selective statement, so in the end the spokesman had to push to get Taiwan mentioned in the question-and-answer session.
Nor did Bush reiterating the US "one China" policy based on the three joint US-Sino communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and non-support for Taiwan's independence make it onto the news pages in US media.
This was Bush's first meeting with Hu since the Chinese leader took over from former president Jiang Zemin (
The US official merely offered a brief explanation of the discussion about Taiwan and no one asked any follow-up questions. As for Taiwan, he said Bush had reiterated the US' "one China" policy based on the three joint US-Sino communiques, the TRA and non-support for Taiwan's independence.
Hu basically accepted Bush's statement and said that it was positive. China also said, however, that it was concerned about forces moving Taiwan in the direction of independence. Bush said that the US does not support Taiwan independence.
However, Bush said that, based on this position, the US would, if necessary, do its utmost to help Taiwan defend itself. As stated in the TRA, it would provide the defensive arms needed to do this.
Two of the three fundamental conditions for the US "one China" policy mentioned by Bush are viewed as desirable by China -- namely the three joint communiques and the non-support for Taiwan's independence, while it is firmly opposed to the third condition, the TRA. This is because the act is part of US legislation and it is the foundation for US government guarantees for the security of Taiwan in the face of China's military might.
If Hu says he basically accepts the TRA, he is either making a mistake, or China's position has changed.
The main focus of the three joint communiques and the non-support for Taiwan independence lies on the issues of Taiwan security and sovereignty. The Aug. 17, 1982 communique includes un-clear restrictions to the quality and quantity of US arms sales to Taiwan, but these restrictions were basically eliminated by the 1992 sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taipei.
When it comes to the sovereignty issue, the US does not recognize the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan, but merely says that the two should resolve their disputes peacefully. The US has to take this position to be able to guarantee the security of Taiwan. Otherwise, US arms sales to Tai-pei would be seen as an intervention in domestic affairs.
The old phrase "non-support for Taiwan's independence,"which was minted during the late US president Richard Nixon's days in the White House, has a subtle meaning. When Nixon secretly gave Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (
Zhou wanted Nixon and Henry Kissinger to guarantee that the US would not support Taiwan-independence movements in the US or anywhere else. Nixon gave this guarantee and he also guaranteed that he would not support two Chinas.
Put another way, Beijing insisted on blocking all doors for Taiwan, thus forcing Taipei to play the "one China" zero-sum game with China, a game Beijing believed it would win. China also wanted to force the US into not recognizing Taiwan as a nation.
All this took place before the democratization of Taiwan, and these were all unilateral promises made by the US president. Such policies are not permanent, and the promises must be reiterated by a each new US government. If they are not, policies will be thought to have changed and the original promises will lose validity.
Just as is the case with the "one China" concept, the meaning of "non-support for Taiwan independence" is unclear. The US uses "non-support for Taiwan independence" in the sense that it will not intervene to provide assistance to Taipei. It carries the notion of "none of my business" and implies a wish to stay on the sidelines.
China and its cohorts are unhappy because "non-support for Taiwan independence" carries a sense of passivity, and they therefore try to supplant it with the term "opposition to."
During the Chiang era, the US position was "non-support for Communist China entering the UN." Chiang felt that the US position wasn't firm enough, and that they should use the term "opposition to," which highlights the difference in meaning between the two terms.
Because there is no coherent definition of "Taiwan independence," the US' "non-support for Taiwan independence" is in fact an empty phrase aimed at placating Beijing. The opposite of independence is "dependence." Independence means wanting to become independent from another nation of which one used to be a part.
Taiwan, however, has never been a part of the PRC, it has always been independent of it. Both former president Lee Teng-hui (
In the diplomatic arena, the US does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, but in practice, it views it as such. The TRA stipulates that wherever US legislation mentions "foreign," "foreign nationality," "foreign nation," "foreign government" or similar entities, these terms shall also include Taiwan and the laws shall also apply to Taiwan.
The US can choose not to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state based on its own political interests, but it cannot oppose the nation's insistence on being a sovereign state.
Lee declared that Taiwan is a sovereign state, and, after becoming president, Chen did so as well, in unambiguous terms.
What has been the reaction of the US government to these statements? It has stressed that China constitutes a threat to the security of Taiwan and continued to increase its arms sales to Taipei. According to the US definition, neither Lee nor Chen have been advocating Taiwan's independence. Had they done so, continued US arms sales to Taipei would be tantamount to US support for Taiwan independence.
Based on its own interests, the US has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign state, but neither has it recognized PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. In the past, it has stressed that the "Taiwan issue" should be peacefully resolved by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, but this position was not reiterated during the briefing following the meeting between Bush and Hu.
Instead, an even clearer response by Bush to Hu was quoted, saying that based on the US position of not supporting Taiwan's independence "the US would, if necessary, do its utmost to help Taiwan defend itself."
Previous US administrations have dealt with the issue using the diplomatic phrase "peaceful solution," but the term "Taiwan issue" was not used on this occasion. This is to Taiwan's advantage. The term "peaceful solu-tion" carries the notion of applying pressure to push for a solution. Too frequent repetition of this phrase is not helpful to Taipei.
Bush was more direct than his predecessors in telling Hu that the US is determined to do its utmost to help Taiwan defend itself. The US position is to not support Taiwan independence, but "if necessary, ie, if China took military action," the US would do its utmost to help Taiwan defend itself.
China and its mouthpieces are fond of using the US position of non-support for Taiwan's independence for their own propaganda purposes. But there is, in fact, no longer a question in Taiwan of whether or not it should be independent, but only the question of whether it will be annexed by China.
Seeing the precision arms used by the US in its two wars in Iraq as well as in Bosnia, Beijing and its cohorts in Taiwan are acutely aware of the fact that China would run the risk of a conflict with the US if it were to use military force to annex Taiwan, and that such a move would be no different from self destruction. Their only option is to wage a unification propaganda war against Taiwan and mislead the public by creating confusion and worry and undermining morale and confidence in the nation's future.
The people of Taiwan must be vigilant and psychologically prepared against such developments.
James Wang is a Washington-based journalist.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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